Taxing Litigation: Federal Tax Concerns of Personal Injury Plaintiffs and Their Lawyers by Polsky, Gregg
Masthead Logo Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2018
Taxing Litigation: Federal Tax Concerns of
Personal Injury Plaintiffs and Their Lawyers
Gregg Polsky
Francis Shackelford Distinguished Professor in Taxation Law
University of Georgia School of Law, gregg.polsky@uga.edu
bepress Logo SSRN Logo
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Gregg Polsky, Taxing Litigation: Federal Tax Concerns of Personal Injury Plaintiffs and Their Lawyers , 22 Fla. Tax Rev. 120 (2018),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/1281
FLORIDA TAX REVIEW
Volume 22 2018 Number 1
TAXING LITIGATION: FEDERAL TAX CONCERNS OF PERSONAL
INJURY PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR LAWYERS
by
Gregg D. Polsky*
ABSTRACT
This Article addresses the federal tax concerns ofpersonal injury plain-
tiffs and the lawyers who represent them, typically on a contingency-
fee basis. It explains when plaintiffs' recoveries are taxable for income
and employment tax purposes and whether and how those recoveries
are required to be reported by defendants to the IRS. It also discusses
whether attorney's fees and costs are deductible by plaintiffs.
In addition to these tax planning and compliance issues, the
Article also considers when tax evidence might be admissible. Plaintiffs
and defendants often try to introduce tax evidence in an effort to increase
or decrease, respectively, the amount of damages awarded. These
attempts have been met with varying degrees of success, depending on
the jurisdiction and context.
The Article then addresses the personal tax issues of trial law-
yers themselves. Structured attorney fee arrangements, whereby these
lawyers attempt to defer tax on contingent fees, are discussed. The tax
deductibility of litigation costs advanced by contingent fee lawyers to
their clients is considered. Finally, the Article concludes with a discus-
sion of how provisions of the 2017 Tax Act might affect trial lawyers.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses the federal tax concerns of personal injury plain-
tiffs and the lawyers who represent them, typically on a contingency-fee
basis. Plaintiffs need to know whether their recoveries are taxable and
whether their attorney's fees are deductible. Plaintiffs' lawyers need to
understand their client's tax concerns and how payments made by defen-
dants or insurance companies will be reported to the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). In addition, litigants may seek to introduce tax evidence to
influence the factfinder's calculation of damages. Plaintiffs' lawyers also
face their personal tax issues in managing their own legal practices.
While this Article covers all of this ground, it pays particular
attention to three important developments stemming from the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act of 2017 (2017 Tax Act). First, certain plaintiffs will no lon-
ger be able to deduct their attorney's fees and costs, which can result in
extremely high effective tax rates in contingent fee situations. Second,
under the so-called "Harvey Weinstein" rule, payments of damages for
sexual abuse or harassment accompanied by a nondisclosure agreement
are now nondeductible, as are payments of attorney's fees in these cases.
Finally, the new tax law created a significant new deduction, known as
the pass-through deduction, which may be helpful to some lawyers.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the tax con-
cerns of plaintiffs. Part II addresses the tax reporting and withholding
requirements imposed on defendants and insurance companies. Part III
explains the tax consequences to defendants when they pay settlements or
judgments. Part IV discusses the situations where tax evidence may be
taken into account by juries or judges in setting the amount of damages.
Parts V and VI turn the attention to the tax concerns of plaintiffs' law-
yers. Part V analyzes the unique tax issues faced by plaintiffs' lawyers,
while Part VI discusses the impact of the 2017 Tax Act on these lawyers.
I. TAX CONSEQUENCES TO PERSONAL INJURY PLAINTIFFS
A. Foundational Tax Concepts
Most taxpayers face two types of annual federal taxes: the income tax and
the employment tax. The income tax taxes a taxpayer's net income from
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any source, while the employment tax generally taxes a taxpayer's wages.
A taxpayer's net income is equal to the excess of the taxpayer's gross
income over the taxpayer's deductions. Gross income generally includes
all accessions to wealth,1 which includes cash receipts that are not offset
by any cost (or "tax basis"). Thus, if a taxpayer earns $100 of wages or
fees, the taxpayer realizes $100 of gross income. But if the taxpayer sells
stock, which was previously purchased for $80 (giving her a tax basis of
$80 in the stock), for $100, she realizes only $20 of gross income. Some
items of gross income, such as certain damages received on account of
personal physical injuries, are specifically excluded from gross income.2
A taxpayer has no tax basis in her body or in her physical or
emotional well-being, so personal injury victims would realize gross
income equal to the entire amount of the recovery, unless the exclusion
mentioned above applies.' Thus, for personal injury plaintiffs, a critical
threshold issue is whether and to what extent the exclusion applies. If
the exclusion does not apply, the award is included gross income. In those
cases, a key issue is whether the plaintiff can deduct her attorney's fees.
In addition, where the exclusion does not apply, an important issue is
whether any portion of the recovery is also subject to wage taxes.
B. Is the Recovery Included in Plaintiff's Gross Income?
1. Broad Exclusionary Rule in Physical Injury Cases
Section 104(a)(2) provides a significant exclusion from gross income
for damages "on account of personal physical injuries or physical
1. See generally I.R.C. § 61; Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348
U.S. 426 (1955).
2. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
3. However, if the recovery includes a component for damage to
property, such as to the taxpayer's car, the portion of the recovery attributable
to the property would be offset by the taxpayer's basis in the car and would
reduce such basis. For example, if a car accident plaintiff recovers $10,000 for
damage to her personal car, which she had bought for $25,000, the plaintiff
would not realize any gross income with respect to that $10,000. Instead, the
$10,000 would reduce her basis in the car down from $25,000 to $15,000. If
she spent the $10,000 to repair the car, her basis in the car would go back up to
$25,000. See Big Four Indus., Inc. v. Comm'r, 40 T.C. 1055, 1060 (1963), acq.,
1964-2 C.B. 3, 4; Reg. § 1.263(a)-3(k)(1)(iii); F.S.A. 2002-28-005 (Mar. 29,
2002); P.L.R. 93-08-013 (Nov. 24, 1992).
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sickness."4 Subject to only a few exceptions detailed below, if a claim
originates in a physical injury or sickness, the resulting damages are
excluded from gross income and therefore tax-free. Thus, in claims
involving car accidents, medical malpractice, slips-and-falls, products
liability, and batteries, recoveries that represent pain and suffering, men-
tal anguish, disfigurement, physical disability or impairment, inconve-
nience, loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life, lost wages (past or
future), and medical expenses (past or future) are generally excluded
from gross income.5
2. Three Specific Exceptions
While most categories of damages received in a physical injury case are
excluded, there are three exceptions. First, punitive damages are included
in gross income and therefore taxable.6 Likewise, any portion of the
award that represents pre- or post-judgment interest is taxable.7 Finally,
any recovery of prior out-of-pocket medical expenses that were previ-
ously claimed as a deduction is taxable.'
4. Emphasis added.
5. See Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50 (in settlement arising out of
bus accident resulting in bodily injury, the entire settlement was excluded
from gross income, including the portion allocable to lost wages).
6. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (providing for exclusion in personal physical
injury and physical sickness cases for damages "other than punitive dam-
ages"). There is a narrow exception to this rule in section 104(c). That provi-
sion allows for punitive damages arising out of a physical injury to be excluded
in a wrongful death case where the applicable state wrongful death law (as in
effect on September 13, 1995) provides, or has been construed by a court to
provide, that only punitive damages may be awarded in such an action. See
also Benavides v. United States, 497 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that
section 104(c) does not exclude punitive damages when the general wrongful
death laws of the state do not limit recovery to punitive damages, even if some
other law, such as workers' compensation law, might have such a limit).
7. See Chamberlain v. United States, 401 F.3d 335, 347 (5th Cir. 2005)
(holding that prejudgment interest is taxable even where other components of
the award were tax-free under section 104(a)(2)); Delaney v. Comm'r, 99 F.3d
20, 27 (1st Cir. 1996) (same); Brabson v. United States, 73 F.3d 1040, 1047
(10th Cir. 1996) (same); Kovacs v. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 124, 132-33 (1993) (same).
8. See I.R.C. § 104(a) (carving out from the exclusion "amounts
attributable to (and not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213
[Vol122:1
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The inclusionary rule for previously deducted medical expenses
is typically of little significance. First, due to private insurance, Medi-
care, Medicaid, or the fact that they lack the financial ability to pay,
plaintiffs often do not pay large amounts of medical expenses out of
pocket. Second, medical expenses are only deductible to the extent that
the aggregate amount of out-of-pocket medical expenses paid during the
year exceeds 7.5 or 10% 9 of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income for
that year." Third, only taxpayers who itemize their deductions (in lieu
of claiming the standard deduction) can deduct medical expenses. His-
torically, about one-third of taxpayers itemized their deductions, but
the 2017 Tax Act will dramatically reduce this percentage because it
nearly doubled the standard deduction while limiting or eliminating a
host of itemized deductions.11 The bottom line is that few plaintiffs will
have received a tax benefit from previously deducted medical expenses,
which means that any recovery of those expenses will not be taxed.
12
On the other hand, the inclusions in gross income of punitive
damages and interest can be significant in certain cases. In a case
involving egregious conduct by a defendant in a physical injury case,
the IRS could assert that a significant portion of the plaintiff's recovery
(relating to medical, etc., expenses) for any prior taxable year"). The inclusion
in gross income of the recovery of previously deducted medical expenses
effectively reverses out the prior deduction for expenses that are not (after the
recovery) financially borne by the plaintiff.
9. Due to statutory amendments, the "floor" has bounced between
7.5% and 10%. In 2018, the floor is 7.5%, but it is scheduled to rise to 10%
beginning in 2019. I.R.C. § 213(f)(2).
10. I.R.C. § 213. Adjusted gross income generally equals the tax-
payer's gross income less business deductions. I.R.C. § 62.
11. For married taxpayers, the standard deduction was $12,700 in
2017, while it is $24,000 in 2018. I.R.C. § 63(c)(7); Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-2
C.B. 707. The 2017 Tax Act also capped the state and local tax deduction at
$10,000, whereas before it was unlimited. I.R.C. § 164(b)(6).
12. Recoveries representing future medical expenses are tax-free.
See Rev. Rul. 75-232, 1975-1 C.B. 94 (the "dollars designated for future med-
ical expenses relating to the injuries suffered [are] excludable from gross
income under the provisions of section 104(a)[(2)] of the Code"). However,
the plaintiff will be denied a deduction in the future for medical expenses that
are paid out of the recovery. Thus, if the plaintiff receives $100,000 for future
medical costs, the first $100,000 of medical expenses paid will not be eligible
for a deduction under section 213. See id.
2018]
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represents taxable punitive damages. And in a physical injury case
involving a lengthy appeal, a large portion of the plaintiff's recovery
may constitute taxable post-judgment interest.
3. Wrongful Death, Consortium Claims, and Bystander Claims
In wrongful death and loss of consortium claims, the plaintiff (the estate
or spouse) is not the direct victim of the physical injury or sickness. Nev-
ertheless, the legislative history makes clear that these recoveries were
intended to be covered by the section 104(a)(2) exclusion:
If an action has its origin in a physical injury or physi-
cal sickness, then all damages (other than punitive dam-
ages) that flow therefrom are treated as payments
received on account of physical injury or physical sick-
ness whether or not the recipient of the damages is the
injured party. For example, damages (other than puni-
tive damages) received by an individual on account of
a claim for loss of consortium due to the physical injury
or physical sickness of such individual's spouse are
excludable from gross income.13
This approach has been followed by the IRS in private letter rulings
involving wrongful death and consortium claims.14
It is not clear whether damages would be excluded in bystander
claims where the link between the damages and the physical injury is
more tenuous. For example, in California a plaintiff may recover for the
emotional disturbance of witnessing an accident that causes physical
harm to a close relative.15 Arguably, such a claim is "an action [that] has
its origin in a physical injury" and the damages "flow therefrom," as
required by the legislative history quoted above. However, there are no
tax cases or rulings that address this specific situation.
13. H.R. REP. No. 104-737, at 301 (1996) (Conf Rep.), as reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1793.
14. See P.L.R. 2001-21-031 (Feb. 16, 2001) (loss of consortium
damages in asbestos case excluded); P.L.R. 2000-29-020 (Apr. 18, 2000)
(wrongful death damages received by estate stemming from automobile acci-
dent excluded).
15. See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 925 (Cal. 1968).
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4. Recoveries ofLegal Fees and Costs from the Defendant
If a claim is fully covered by section 104(a)(2) so that all damages are
excluded from gross income, any recovery of legal fees or court costs
from the defendant is likewise excluded.16 If a claim is only partially cov-
ered by section 104(a)(2) because, for example, a portion of the recov-
ery represents interest or punitive damages, then the recovered fees must
be allocated between the taxable and tax-free portions of the award,
and courts and the IRS typically use a pro rata allocation."i For exam-
ple, if a physically injured plaintiff recovers $1,000,000 in compensa-
tory damages,18 $300,000 in punitive damages, $200,000 in interest, and
$300,000 in statutory legal fees, the legal fees must be allocated between
the taxable portion of the recovery (the punitive damages and interest)
and the tax-free portion (the compensatory damages) on a pro rata basis.
Because the taxable portion totals $500,000 and the tax-free portion
totals $1,000,000, one-third ($100,000) of the legal fees are included in
gross income and the remaining two-thirds ($200,000) are tax-free. The
plaintiff therefore must include in gross income $600,000 of the total
$1.8 million recovery.
5. Allocations of Settlements
Where a portion of an otherwise tax-free recovery is taxable (because
the portion represents punitive damages, interest, or a recovery of pre-
viously deducted medical expenses), an allocation is necessary to deter-
mine the taxable component. If a judgment is paid in full, the allocation
will typically be easy because the verdict will differentiate the damage
components. When, as is far more common, the case settles before trial,
allocations are much more difficult.
Well-advised parties will typically enter into a specific allo-
cation in the settlement agreement, and courts give some degree of
16. See e.g., Fite v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1993-594, 66 T.C.M. (CCH)
1588 (1993).
17. See Johnson-Waters v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1993-333, 66 T.C.M.
(CCH) 252 (1993); P.L.R. 2004-03-046 (Jan. 16, 2004).
18. Assume that none of the compensatory damages represents a
recovery of previously deducted medical expenses. Otherwise, that portion of
the compensatory damages would be taxable and would change the calcula-
tions. See I.R.C. § 104(a).
2018]
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deference to the parties' agreed allocation.19 However, the IRS and some
courts have realized that, no matter how adversarial the parties are before
reaching a financial compromise, they are not adversarial in making
allocations because the defendant's tax consequences will be the same
regardless. 0 Furthermore, defendants often strongly prefer to disclaim
that they are paying any punitive damages due to public relations or
insurance concerns; therefore, the parties are strongly aligned in desir-
ing to avoid making explicit allocations to punitive damages.2 1 In fact,
it is rare if not unprecedented to see a settlement agreement that specif-
ically allocates amounts to punitive damages.22
19. See, e.g., McKay v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 465, 482 (1994), vacated
on other grounds, 84 F.3d 433, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 45181 (5th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that an express allocation in a settlement agreement is the "most
important factor" in allocating settlements among various components); Byrne
v. Comm'r, 90 T.C. 1000, 1007 (1988), rev'd on other grounds, 883 F.2d 211
(3d Cir. 1989) (same).
20. See Bagley v. Comm'r, 121 F.3d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1997) (noting
that "when the time comes to settle a case, no matter how adversarial the pro-
ceedings have been to that point, the parties will almost always be in agree-
ment that no part of a settlement agreement should be explicitly allocated to
punitive damages" and concluding that non-adversarial allocations should be
scrutinized).
21. See Robert W. Wood, Tax Aspects of Settlements and Judg-
ments, 522-4th TAX MGMT. PORT. (BNA) § III.E (noting that, even leaving aside
tax consequences, "it would be highly atypical for a settlement agreement to
acknowledge that any portion of the settlement was paid on account of puni-
tive damage" and that "[v]irtually no defendant would agree to such a charac-
terization"); Bagley, 121 F.3d at 396 ("It will almost never be to a defendant's
advantage to allocate part of a lump-sum settlement to punitive damages, and
it will often be disadvantageous. Often, insurance policies will not cover such
awards, and punitive-damage awards result in worse publicity than compensa-
tory awards. Most plaintiffs will not want specific allocations to punitive dam-
ages in their settlement agreements, because punitive damages are taxable.").
22. See Bagley, 121 F.3d at 396 n.7 (noting that the defendant's
attorney, "an experienced Iowa litigator, told the Tax Court that he could recall
no settlement with which he had been involved that specifically allocated a
certain amount to punitive damages in the settlement agreement"); Tom Baker,
Transforming Punishment into Compensation: In the Shadow of Punitive
Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 211, 218 (explaining that none of the thirty prom-
inent personal injury lawyers interviewed "reported ever settling a case for an
[Vol122:1
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Despite this skepticism, allocations in settlement agreements are
still helpful, provided that they are reasonable.23 In addition to consid-
ering an express allocation in a settlement agreement, the IRS and courts
will evaluate the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the
underlying claim and the course of litigation to determine the true eco-
nomic substance of the settlement. Plaintiffs' lawyers should be aware
that their court filings and other work product could eventually become
relevant evidence in a tax dispute between their client and the IRS.
Some commentators recommend that plaintiffs' lawyers avoid high-
lighting the punitive nature of the plaintiff's claims in court filings and
other documents.2 4
6. Broad Inclusionary Rule in Nonphysical Injury Cases
The broad exclusionary rule in section 104(a)(2) applies only to personal
injury claims that involve a physical injury or sickness. 25 The statute
makes clear that emotional distress is not treated as a physical injury or
sickness. 26 The legislative history explained that Congress intended for
emotional distress to include "physical symptoms (e.g., insomnia, head-
aches, and stomach disorders) which may result from such emotional
distress.127 The IRS and courts have adhered to this approach of not
treating physical symptoms of emotional distress as a physical injury
amount that included a portion identified as 'punitive damages'); Wood,
supra note 21 (stating that such an allocation would be "highly atypical").
23. See Brent B. Nicholson & Douglas K. Chapman, Enforceabil-
ity of Settlement Allocations Under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 97, 113 (1995) (arguing that express allocations in
settlement agreements "shift the debate to the issue of enforceability, which...
[should be] an easier argument for [the taxpayer] to win").
24. See, e.g., Kevin A. Palmer, Recent Developments in the Taxa-
tion of Punitive Damages Awards, 73 TAXES 596, 600 (1995) (arguing that
plaintiffs should avoid making punitive damage claims in their initial com-
plaint to strengthen tax position that entire settlement is allocated to compen-
satory damages).
25. Emphasis added.
26. I.R.C. § 104(a) (flush language) (stating that, for purposes of the
section 104 (a) (2) exclusion, "emotional distress shall not be treated as a phys-
ical injury or physical sickness").
27. See H.R. REP. No. 104-737, supra note 13, at 369 n.56.
2018]
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or sickness which triggers the application of the broad section 104(a)(2)
exclusion.
28
Thus, while emotional distress damages that stem from physi-
cal injuries or sickness are not taxed, 29 in "pure" emotional distress cases
and other nonphysical injury cases all damages are taxed with one minor
exception. The one exception is for damages that represent a recovery
of out-of-pocket medical expenses attributable to the emotional distress,
such as psychiatrist's bills, that were not previously deducted by the
plaintiff.3
The following are examples of common nonphysical injury
claims to which the broad inclusionary rule generally applies: employ-
ment discrimination, sexual harassment, intentional or negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress, defamation, malicious prosecution, invasion
of privacy, false imprisonment, fraud, trespass, and nonphysical civil
rights claims.31 In these cases, the plaintiff often must include the full
recovery in gross income.
7. Distinguishing Between Physical Sickness and
Symptoms of Emotional Distress
In light of the significant tax distinction made between physical sick-
ness and emotional distress claims, it is not surprising that plaintiffs
28. See, e.g., Lindsey v. Comm'r, 422 F.3d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 2005)
(in applying section 104(a)(2) "hypertension and stress-related symptoms,
including periodic impotency, insomnia, fatigue, occasional ingestion and uri-
nary incontinence" were mere symptoms of emotional distress rather than a
physical sickness); Banaitis v. Comm'r, 340 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426 (2005); Gutierrez v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2011-263, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 480 (2011).
29. Reg. § 1.104-1(c)(1) (explaining that "damages for emotional
distress attributable to a physical injury or physical sickness are excluded from
income under section 104(a)(2)"). Recall that all damages that flow from a
physical injury or sickness are excluded, except for punitive damages, interest,
and previously deducted medical expenses.
30. IR.C. § 104(a) (flush language) (providing that, solely for out-
of-pocket medical expenses, emotional distress shall be treated as a physical
injury).
31. See e.g., Stadnyk v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2008-289, 96 T.C.M.
(CCH) 475, 478 (2008) ("physical restraint and physical detention" in a false
imprisonment case are not "physical injuries" under section 104(a)(2)).
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often try to fit into the former category. While the IRS and courts con-
sistently find, based on the legislative history, that "symptoms" or "man-
ifestations" of emotional distress (such as ulcers and migraines) do not
suffice,32 other more extreme medical conditions occasionally do. For
example, in Domeny v. Commissioner,33 a plaintiff's pre-existing mul-
tiple sclerosis condition was allegedly exacerbated by emotional distress
stemming from workplace problems, and the Tax Court held that this
exacerbation constituted a physical sickness under section 104(a)(2).
Likewise, in Parkinson v. Commissioner, the plaintiff suffered a heart
attack allegedly from emotional distress caused by his employer's con-
duct.34 The Tax Court found that it "would seem self-evident that a heart
attack and its physical aftereffects constitute a physical injury or sick-
ness rather than mere subjective sensations or symptoms of emotional
distress."35 These cases suggest that where the plaintiff's physical reac-
tions to emotional distress are quite severe, they should be well-
documented so as to buttress the argument that damages are excluded
under section 104(a)(2).
8. Specific Exclusion for Wrongful Incarceration
While damages from private false imprisonment cases are generally tax-
able due to the absence of a physical injury or sickness,36 payments
made for wrongful incarceration by the government are now specifically
excluded from gross income under section 139F. Section 139F became
effective in December 2015.
32. See, e.g., Blackwood v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2012-190, 104
T.C.M. (CCH) 27, 30 (2012) (entire settlement taxable where taxpayer suffered
a relapse of depression, which resulted in insomnia, migraines, and other phys-
ical conditions, because these "physical symptoms of depression were [not]
severe enough to rise to the level of a physical injury or sickness").
33. Domeny v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2010-9, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1047
(2010).
34. Parkinson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2010-142, 99 T.C.M. (CCH)
1583 (2010).
35. Id. at 1586.
36. See Stadnyk, 96 T.C.M. (CCH) at 478 ("[P]hysical restraint
and physical detention are not 'physical injuries' for purposes of section
104(a)(2).").
2018]
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C. Is the Recovery Subject to Wage Taxes?
Employment taxes are imposed on wages received by a taxpayer. In
some cases, recoveries of damages are considered wages. However, if
the defendant is not a former, current, or would-be (in refusal to hire
cases) employer of the plaintiff, none of the recovery will be character-
ized as wages. In addition, to the extent a recovery is excluded from
gross income under section 104(a)(2) (because it arises out of a personal
physical injury or sickness), it does not constitute wages.
Where the defendant is a former, current, or would-be employer
and the recovery is taxable, the portions of the recovery that constitute
back pay or severance pay are clearly considered wages,37 and the IRS's
position is that the portion representing front pay is also treated
as wages,38 though one court has disagreed. 9 On the other hand,
amounts attributable to emotional distress, medical expenses, interest,
37. See United States v. Quality Stores, Inc., 572 U.S. 141, 156
(2014) (severance pay is considered wages); Soc. Sec. Bd. v. Nierotko, 327
U.S. 358, 370 (1946) (back pay is considered wages). In refusal to hire cases
(where no formal employment relationship is ever created), the IRS's position
is that the payments made are characterized as back pay and therefore consti-
tute wages (Rev. Rul. 78-176, 1978-1 C.B. 303), but the Eighth Circuit has
disagreed (Newhouse v. McCormick & Co., 157 F.3d 582 (8th Cir. 1998)). The
IRS likewise takes the position that lost wages and benefits paid under the Fam-
ily Medical & Leave Act (FMLA) constitute wages, but the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania has disagreed based on the particular language in the FMLA. Carr
v. Fresenius Med. Care, No. 05-2228, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29627 (E.D. Pa.
May 16, 2006); Churchill v. Star Enters., 3 F. Supp.2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 1998). But
see Cheetham v. CSX Transp., No. 3:06-cv-704-J-PAM-TEM, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49659 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2012) (declining to follow Carr and Churchill
and holding that FMLA lost wages and benefits are wages). Payments made to
cancel or buy out an employment contract are also considered wages by the IRS.
See Rev. Rul. 2004-110, 2004-2 C.B. 960.
38. Field Att'y Adv. 2013-3501F (July 11, 2013) (noting that the
IRS's position is that front pay constitutes wages); see also Gerbec v. United
States, 164 F.3d 1015, 1026 (6th Cir. 1999).
39. See Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682, 689-90 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding, since front pay compensates for a "loss in earning capacity," it is not
considered wages, even though back pay is). But see Gerbec, 164 F.3d at 1026
(holding that front pay, like back pay, is wages); Mayberry v. United States,
151 F.3d 855, 860 (8th Cir. 1998) (same); Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d
204, 209 (4th Cir. 1997) (same).
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reimbursement of attorney's fees and court costs, statutory penalties,4"
and punitive damages are not considered wages.41 Therefore, allocations
between wage and non-wage portions will be necessary in employment-
related settlements that involve payments in both categories. Because
wage taxes are paid by both employers and employees, both parties have a
tax incentive to minimize allocations to the wage portions. While specific
allocations in settlement agreements are given some weight by courts,
the IRS is well aware that allocations away from wages are self-serving
for both parties.42 Therefore, allocations in settlement agreements should
reasonably reflect the economic substance of the settlement. 43
D. Deduction for Attorney's Fees and Costs
If a plaintiff's recovery is entirely excluded from gross income, he or
she may not claim any deduction for legal fees or costs paid because tax-
payers cannot deduct expenses attributable to tax-exempt income.44
However, if some or all of the recovery is taxable, then the plaintiff may
be able to deduct some or all of those fees and costs. In the 2004 case of
Commissioner v. Banks, 45 the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed that, in a
contingent fee arrangement, the plaintiff must include the entire amount
of the recovery (including the attorney-fee portion) in gross income. This
is true whether the defendant writes two checks-one to the attorney
40. But see I.R.S. Info. Ltr. 2005-0094 (Mar. 17, 2005) (explaining
that penalties under California Labor Code section 226.7 for failure to provide
the employee with a meal or rest period are considered wages).
41. See, e.g., T.A.M. 2002-44-004 (June 19, 2002) (determining
that emotional distress payments and reimbursement of attorney fees and
costs paid by employer are not wages).
42. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
43. In addition, the IRS has determined that in some situations a
failure to explicitly allocate amounts in a settlement agreement will preclude
a taxpayer from making an allocation to a non-wage element. Specifically, the
IRS determined that a failure to specifically allocate a portion of an award to
the recovery of statutory attorney fees in an employment-related case resulted
in the entire settlement being characterized as wages. See Field Att'y Adv.
2013-3501F (July 11, 2013).
44. See I.R.C. § 265(a).
45. 543 U.S. 426 (2005). Note that the IRS has recognized one
exception to the Banks rule. In so-called "opt-out" class action litigation, the
IRS has ruled that attorney fees paid by non-lead plaintiffs are not included in
gross income. See, e.g., P.L.R. 2009-06-010 (Oct. 24, 2008).
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for the attorney-fee portion of the settlement and the other for the remain-
der to the plaintiff-or only one check to the attorney, who thereafter
remits the amount remaining after fees to the plaintiff. In other words,
regardless of the formalities of payment, the plaintiff is treated for tax
purposes as if she receives the gross settlement amount and then pays
her own attorney for fees and costs.46
In other words, Banks re-characterized the parties' formal
arrangement. Formally, the defendant paid the plaintiff's attorney
directly as depicted in Figure 1:
Figure 1:
Cash(representing the Contingent fee portion of the award)
However, under Banks, the transaction is re-characterized, for income
tax purposes, as follows:
es (ross icome unless excluded)
fee (potentially deduct ble
Thus, under Banks, the plaintiff is no longer a mere bystander; instead, the
contingent fee portion of the recovery is deemed to flow through the plain-
tiff on its way to the plaintiff's attorney. This has significant implications
in cases where the plaintiffs attorney's fee is not fully deductible.
For example, assume that in a nonphysical injury case, a plain-
tiff settles a case for $1,000,000. Pursuant to the settlement, the
46. The same rule even applies if attorney's fees are awarded under
a federal or state fee-shifting statute. Regardless of the formalities of payment
(i.e., two checks or one), the plaintiff is deemed for tax purposes to receive the
entire recovery (including the statutory attorney's fees) and then to pay over
an appropriate amount of that recovery to the attorney. See Program Manager
Tech. Adv. 2009-035 (Oct. 22, 2008).
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defendant delivers a check for $1,000,000 to the plaintiff's attorney,
who remits a $600,000 check to the plaintiff and keeps the remaining
$400,000 as the attorney's fee. Under Banks, the plaintiff must include
the gross $1,000,000 settlement in gross income, rather than just the
$600,000 net payment that she receives. She is also treated as making a
$400,000 payment to her attorney. If the payment is fully deductible,
the plaintiff's net taxable income from settlement would equal $600,000
($1,000,000 of gross income less a $400,000 deduction), which puts her
in the same place had she just included the net settlement amount
($600,000) in gross income in the first place. But, critically, in some
cases the plaintiff will not be able to deduct the attorney fee payment,
which results in the plaintiff getting taxed on the gross $1,000,000 set-
tlement even though she only walks away with $600,000 of cash.47 In
those cases, the plaintiff has $400,000 of phantom income.
Thus, in taxable recovery situations, a critical issue is whether
the plaintiff can deduct attorney's fees and costs. Fortunately, in most
taxable recovery situations, the plaintiff can. But in some situations the
plaintiff cannot, and the resulting tax consequences can be devastating.
In fact, in extreme cases, the tax burden to the plaintiff can be greater
than the amount of cash she walks away with, turning a pre-tax winner
into an after-tax loser.
A deduction for attorney's fees and costs is allowed in busi-
ness- and employment-related cases, as well as in federal, state, or local
civil rights claims and actions based on violations of certain federal
statutes.48 Other taxable recoveries however result in no deduction. Thus,
47. Banks stands for the proposition that the attorney fee portion of
a recovery is included in the plaintiff's gross income. The IRS recognizes one
exception to this rule. In opt-out class action litigation, the IRS allows the
class action members to treat their net recovery (i.e., net of attorney fees and
costs) as the amount of the gross income inclusion (in cases where the recov-
ery is taxable). However, in opt-in class action litigation, the traditional Banks
no-netting rule applies.
48. See IR.C. § 62(a)(1) & (20), (e). These provisions cause the
attorney fee deduction to constitute an "above-the-line" deduction. This status
prevents the deductions from being classified as miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions, which as discussed below are disallowed. See IR.C. § 63(d) (defining
itemized deductions as deductions other than above-the-line deductions), § 67(b)
(characterizing certain itemized deductions as miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions). Some have raised the possibility that section 67(g)'s denial of miscella-
neous itemized deductions might somehow affect section 62(a)(20)'s grant of
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plaintiffs who recover for negligent or emotional infliction of emotional
distress, defamation,49 false imprisonment, loss of consortium claims
not based on the family member's physical injury or sickness," fraud,51
bad-faith insurance practices, or trespass on personal-use property will
typically receive no deduction for attorney's fees and costs.
In addition, physical injury plaintiffs who receive taxable com-
ponents (such as punitive damages and interest) cannot deduct the attor-
ney's fees and costs that are attributable to those portions. For example,
assume that a physically injured plaintiff recovers $1,000,000 of com-
pensatory damages and $2,000,000 of punitive damages (or interest)
and pays a $1,000,000 contingent fee. When a plaintiff's recovery is
partially taxable and partially tax-free, the attorney's fees and costs
must be equitably apportioned between the two components, and courts
and the IRS generally pro rate the fees.5 2 Because one-third of the recov-
ery is tax-free, $333,333 of the fees are attributable to that portion and
therefore nondeductible under the general tax rule that expenses that
generate tax-free income are nondeductible. The remaining two-thirds
($666,667) are attributable to the taxable punitive damages and should
in theory be deductible. However, under current tax law they are not.
The end result is that the plaintiff is taxed on the full $2,000,000 of
above-the-line status to deductions for employment and civil rights plaintiffs.
See, e.g., Robert W. Wood, Legal Settlements with Tax Indemnities Are on the
Rise, 160 TAX NOTES 687, 688 (July 30, 2018). This concern however is misplaced
because a deduction must first be characterized as an itemized deduction and
because itemized deductions and above-the-line deductions are mutually exclu-
sive. For further discussion, see Gregg D. Polsky, Letter to the Editor, Miscella-
neous Itemized Deductions and Litigation Expenses, 160 TAX NOTES 1281
(Aug. 27, 2018).
49. If the defamation has its origins in the taxpayer's business (as
opposed to the taxpayer's personal life), then the attorney's fees and costs are
deductible as business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162(a).
50. See, e.g., In re Elkins, 562 B.R. 686, 691-92 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
2016) (holding that the section 139F exclusion does not apply to loss of con-
sortium claims based on wrongful incarceration of a family member).
51. Fraud recoveries are tax-free to the extent they reimburse the
plaintiff for amounts lost in the fraud. But to the extent the fraud recovery is
greater than the amounts lost (e.g., due to interest or punitive damages), the
award is taxable, but the related attorney fees would be nondeductible.
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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punitive damages (or interest) without any offset for any portion of the
$1,000,000 of attorney's fees paid.
In cases where the deduction is denied (other than for the rea-
son that the award is tax-free), plaintiffs historically did receive a type
of a type of deduction known as a "miscellaneous itemized deduction."
But, by virtue of the 2017 Tax Act, beginning in 2018 and continuing
through 2025, all miscellaneous itemized deductions are now disallowed
in their entirety.53 Beginning in 2026, miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions will be allowed again, though they will be subject to certain lim-
itations that applied to them before 2018."4
Even before the 2017 Tax Act, the netting rule in Banks, com-
bined with the pre-2018 limitations on miscellaneous itemized deductions,
stimulated tax experts to try to think of creative ways to re-characterize
or restructure the payment of contingent fees.55 Because the 2017 Tax
53. See I.R.C. § 67(g) (suspending miscellaneous itemized deduc-
tions through 2025).
54. Before 2018 and after 2025, miscellaneous itemized deductions
are only allowed to the extent that they in the aggregate exceed 2% of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 62(a). In addition, under the alter-
native minimum tax, miscellaneous itemized deductions are completely dis-
allowed. I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i).
55. Some commentators argue that the plaintiff's attorney fee should
be capitalized and treated as an offset against the plaintiff's gross settlement.
See Joseph M. Dodge, The Netting of Costs Against Income Receipts (Including
Damage Recoveries) Produced by Such Costs, Without Barring Congressfrom
Disallowing Such Costs, 27 VA. TAX. REV. 297, 334-47 (2007); Charles Dav-
enport, Why Tort Legal Fees Are Not Deductible, 97 TAX NOTES 703, 703-05
(Nov. 4, 2002). But see Brant J. Hellwig & Gregg D. Polsky, Litigation
Expenses and the Alternative Minimum Tax, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 899, 915, 921
(2004). Others have argued that the plaintiff and the attorney could be consid-
ered to have entered into a partnership for tax purposes. See, e.g., John Bog-
danski, Contingent Fees: The Partnership Theory Is Sound, 105 TAX NOTES
426 (Oct. 18, 2004). The Tax Court has rejected this argument on factual
grounds in a typical contingent fee setting. See Bagley v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 105
T.C. 396, 419 (1995), aff'd, 121 F.3d 393, 396 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Based on the
record, we find that there is nothing to indicate that the parties intended the
contingency fee arrangement to be a joint venture or partnership. [The attor-
ney] testified that he regarded the arrangement between himself and [the plain-
tiff] as nothing more than an arrangement for the payment for his services.").
Even if a partnership were created, it is doubtful that it would help plaintiffs
avoid the miscellaneous itemized deduction problem. See Douglas Kahn,
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Act made matters far worse for plaintiffs who incur miscellaneous
itemized deductions, these ideas will surely generate even more inter-
est. To date, however, their efficacy has not been tested before the IRS
or in court.56
Since miscellaneous itemized deductions are scheduled to
spring back to life in 2026, deferring attorney fee payments until then
might be an option worth considering in certain cases. Attorney fee
structures, described below in Part V.A., could be used in this regard.
This strategy is discussed further in that Part.
E. Potential Denial of Deductions for Sexual
Harassment/Abuse Claimants?
The 2017 Tax Act added new Code section 162(q), informally known
as the "Harvey Weinstein rule," which provides:
(q) Payments related to sexual harassment and sex-
ual abuse.-No deduction shall be allowed under this
chapter for-
(1) any settlement or payment related to sexual harass-
ment or sexual abuse if such settlement or payment is
subject to a nondisclosure agreement, or
(2) attorney's fees related to such a settlement or
payment.
Section 162(q)(2)'s denial of attorney's fees seems focused on the
attorney's fees of defendants not plaintiffs for three reasons. First, sec-
tion 162(q)(1) disallows deductions for the underlying "settlement or
payment," which obviously applies only to defendants. Second, the word
Partnership Theory Won't Help Taxpayers in Contingent Attorney Fee Cases,
105 Tax NOTES 885 (Nov. 8, 2004); Gregg D. Polsky, Contingent Fees: Why the
Partnership Theory Doesn't Work, 104 TAx NOTES 1089 (Sept. 6, 2004). For
citations to more back-and-forth over the partnership theory, see Hellwig &
Polsky, supra, at 913-15. Both the capitalization and partnership theories were
raised by the taxpayer late in the Banks litigation, but the Supreme Court
expressly declined to consider them due to the fact that the arguments had not
been raised in the lower courts. Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 437-38 (2005).
56. One commentator has recently suggested that affected plain-
tiffs drop their claims into a trust. Lawrence J. Eisenberg, The Contingency
Fee Tax Trap and a Solution, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Aug. 22, 2018.
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"payment" in both (q)(1) and (q)(2) can never apply to a plaintiff, who
only receives amounts "related to sexual harassment or sexual abuse"
and will not pay any such amounts. In other words, the use of the word
"payment" suggests a focus on payers of damages not recipients of them.
Third, the legislative context indicates that Congress had intended to
punish payers of defendants covering up harassment, not victims of
harassment. Nevertheless, the "attorney's fees related to such a settle-
ment" language is arguably broad enough to capture the plaintiff-side
attorney's fees attributable to a settlement of harassment cases. Ordi-
narily such fees would be deductible in nonphysical injury cases in
employment and civil rights cases.57 Senator Bob Menendez has high-
lighted this ambiguity and proposed an amendment to fix it by making
clear that the language only applies to defendant's attorney's fees.58
Absent a legislative fix, the Treasury or the IRS should clarify through
regulation or rulemaking that section 162(q)(2) applies only to defendant-
side attorney's fees.
Another ambiguity in this new provision is how it relates to set-
tlements of multiple claims. For example, assume that an employee
alleges gender discrimination, sexual harassment, and wage and hour
law violations, and the parties eventually settle for a lump sum. If a non-
disclosure agreement is included, does the nondeduction rule apply to
the entire settlement or only to the portion related to the sexual harass-
ment? If the latter, will the parties' agreement that allocates all of the
settlement to the other claims be respected by the IRS?
F. Structured Settlements
Lump sum settlements of taxable claims are taxed in the year in which
payment is received.59 A lump sum settlement of tax-free claims (e.g.,
57. I.R.C. § 62(a)(20) (characterizing employment and civil rights
plaintiff's attorney fees as above-the-line deductions).
58. Menendez Calls on GOP to Fix Its Tax Bill to Protect Victims of
Workplace Sexual Misconduct, BOB MENENDEZ FOR N.J. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://
www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-calls-on-gop
-to-fix-its-tax-bill-to-protect-victims-of-workplace-sexual-misconduct-.
59. Payment occurs when the plaintiff's lawyer receives the settle-
ment funds on behalf of the attorney. To the extent the plaintiff is allowed a
deduction for attorney's fees paid, it would be allowed in that same year.
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personal physical injury claims) is tax-free.60 However, if the tax-free
cash received by the plaintiff is subsequently invested, the investment
returns are taxed. For example, if the plaintiff invests her settlement in
bonds or annuities, the return on those assets is taxed as interest under
the normal tax rules. In other words, the exclusion for personal physi-
cal injury damages generally applies only to the receipt of the damages
and not to subsequent investment returns on those damages.
Congress created an exception to this rule for certain structured
settlements. In a structured settlement, the settlement agreement between
the plaintiff and the defendant (or its insurer) calls for the defendant to
make future specified payments to the plaintiff in exchange for a release
of the plaintiff's claims. In virtually all structured settlements, the defen-
dant then will immediately assign its obligation to make the specified
future payments to a structured settlement company (SSC). In exchange
for accepting the payment obligation, the SSC receives from the defen-
dant a lump sum payment equal to the present value of the future pay-
ments owed to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in turn, agrees to look only to
the SSC for the future payments.61 The SSC then uses the lump sum
payment that it receives from the defendant to purchase an annuity from
a life insurance company. This annuity is called the funding asset, and
it provides the SSC with the necessary liquidity to satisfy its payment
obligations to the plaintiff. Often, the SSC simply directs the annuity
issuer to pay the annuity benefits directly to the plaintiff. In almost all
cases, the SSC used in a structured settlement is an affiliate of the life
insurance company that issues the annuity that serves as the funding
asset.
A typical structured settlement of a claim covered by the defen-
dant's liability insurance policy is depicted in Figure 2. In a qualified
structured settlement, the damages contributed into the structure rep-
resent tax-free damages, which are generally compensatory damages
incurred in a personal physical injury case. The tax consequences of a
qualified structured settlement are simple. The plaintiff does not report
any income from either the funding or payouts of the structure; every-
thing is tax-free. Physical injury plaintiffs only get this result by entering
60. As discussed above, certain components of otherwise tax-free
recoveries (such as punitive damages and interest) are taxable.
61. In technical terms, the plaintiff grants the defendant (insurer) a
novation with respect to its obligation to make future payments to her.
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Figure 2:
into a structure at the time of settlement. If the plaintiff receives a lump
sum settlement and then immediately invests the cash in an annuity,
the tax benefit is lost.
To illustrate the tax benefits of qualified structured settlements,
consider the following alternative scenarios. In a lump sum settlement,
the plaintiff receives $1,000,000, all of which is tax-free, and invests the
entire amount in an annuity that pays the plaintiff $136,000 per year for
ten years.62 In a qualified structured settlement, the plaintiff does not
receive the lump sum; instead the defendant, through an SSC, buys the
same annuity for the benefit of the plaintiff. Notice that the defendant is
indifferent as between the two structures. In each case, the defendant
pays $1,000,000 and is released from any further liability. In addition,
the defendant receives an immediate tax deduction of $1,000,000.
62. If this is an "ordinary annuity" (first payment is due in one year,
the second in two years, etc.) rather than an "annuity due" (first payment is due
immediately, the second in one year, etc.), the discount rate is 6%. It is assumed
throughout this example that this is an ordinary annuity.
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Leaving aside taxes, the plaintiff is in a very similar position in
both cases.63 The plaintiff will receive the same cash flow-$136,000
per year for ten years-and is subject to the same risk of loss because
the same annuity is used in each instance. However, the tax conse-
quences to the plaintiff are quite different. In the lump sum situation,
the plaintiff must pay tax on $36,000 of each payment.64 No such tax
applies in the structured settlement situation. Assuming the plaintiff's
combined effective federal, state, and local tax rate is 25%, the struc-
tured settlement saves the plaintiff $9,000 in taxes each year for ten
years. Assuming a 6% discount rate (the same rate implied by the annuity
payouts), the present value of the tax savings is approximately $66,000,
or 6.6% of the lump sum settlement value. A higher marginal tax rate or
a longer annuity would make the tax benefit even larger. If the plaintiff
was subject to a 40% marginal tax rate, the structured settlement saves
the plaintiff approximately $106,000 in present value tax. And annu-
itizing the $1,000,000 settlement over 30 (rather than ten) years would
result in over $135,000 of present value tax savings assuming a 25%
marginal tax rate and over $216,000 assuming a 40% rate.
Qualified structured settlements are not available for taxable
awards or for taxable portions of otherwise tax-free awards. In those
cases, nonqualified structured settlements are used. While not entirely
free from doubt, the structured settlement industry believes that non-
qualified structures successfully defer taxation from the time of settle-
ment until the receipt of cash payments. If so, nonqualified structures
represent a tax-efficient way for nonphysical injury plaintiffs to invest
their recoveries in annuities.
To illustrate, assume that in an emotional distress claim not
involving a physical injury or sickness, a plaintiff is offered a $1,000,000
63. It is possible that for some purposes, such as bankruptcy law,
there could be different consequences between the plaintiff owning an annuity
outright and owning it through a structured settlement company. See, e.g., In
re Alexander, 227 B.R. 658, 661 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1998) (holding that quali-
fied structured settlement owned by the debtors was exempt from creditors).
64. See I.R.C. § 72. Note that section 72, which provides the rules
for taxing annuities, under-taxes annuitants on a present value basis by taxing
interest earned in an annuity on a ratable basis instead of how the interest eco-
nomically accrues. In the example above, the $280,000 of total interest earned
by the plaintiff is taxed $28,000 per year for 10 years. In fact, the plaintiff
earns about $60,000 in the first year ($1,000,000 principal times 6%).
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lump sum settlement or, through a nonqualified structured settlement,
an annuity that pays her $136,000 per year for ten years. If the plaintiff
is subject to a 25% combined federal, state, and local effective income
tax rate, the plaintiff would be left with $750,000 after taxes in the lump
sum situation. In the nonqualified structured settlement scenario, the
plaintiff would not be taxed until she receives the annual payments,
which would be fully taxable. Accordingly, the plaintiff would be left
with $102,000 of the $136,000 annual payments after paying the 25%
tax. Thus, the choice is between receiving (on an after-tax basis) $750,000
immediately or $102,000 annually for ten years. Using a 6% discount
rate (which is the rate that is implied by the annuity payout) and adjust-
ing for the plaintiff's assumed 25% tax rate, the after-tax discount rate
is 4.5%. Applying that rate to the $102,000 annual after-tax payments
yields a present value of approximately $807,000, which is $57,000
greater than the after-tax of the lump sum. In short, while the lump sum
payout has an after-tax value of $750,000, the nonqualified structured
settlement (which except for tax is identical) has an after-tax value of
$807,000.
In fact, both qualified and nonqualified structures effectively
provide the same tax benefit-the complete exemption from tax of the
investment return in the annuity. In qualified structures, both the prin-
cipal (the lump sum value) and the yield are tax-free. In nonqualified
structures, the principal is taxed, while the yield is effectively tax-free.65
If the plaintiff's marginal tax rate in the years in which she receives pay-
ments out of a nonqualified structure is lower than the marginal tax
rate that would have applied to a lump sum payout, the plaintiff receives
an additional "smoothing of income" benefit as well. In the example
above, a large part of the $1,000,000 lump sum settlement would have
been subject to the highest marginal tax applicable to individuals, which
is currently 37%. On the other hand, the entire $136,000 annual pay-
ments would likely be subject to a lower marginal tax rate.
65. In the example in the preceding paragraph, if the plaintiff had
paid immediate tax on the $1,000,000 settlement, she would be left with
$750,000 to invest. If she were able to invest on a tax-free basis, her rate of
return would equal the pre-tax rate of 6%. A 10-year annuity earning 6% per
year would pay out $102,000, the same amount she receives after tax from the
nonqualified structured settlement. This shows that, assuming constant tax
rates, the tax benefit from a nonqualified structure is equivalent to a tax exemp-
tion for the investment yield.
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While qualified structures are statutorily allowed under the
Code, nonqualified structures have been "blessed" only by a single pri-
vate letter ruling issued in 2008.66 A private letter ruling is an IRS deter-
mination that provides the IRS's legal conclusion to a set of facts
stipulated by a taxpayer. In the 2008 private letter ruling, the IRS con-
cluded that a nonqualified structure yielded the tax results described
above, namely that the nonphysical injured plaintiff realized income only
when she received cash payments, not when the nonqualified structure
was funded. However, private letter rulings are not binding on the IRS
except with respect to the specific taxpayers to whom they are issued.67
Furthermore, the reasoning behind the private letter ruling and the prin-
cipal case on which it appears to rely, Commissioner v. Childs, is ques-
tionable and has been the subject of criticism.68 (The Childs case, which
involves a structured contingent attorney fee, is discussed in depth in
Part V.A.) Despite the tax-law uncertainty surrounding nonqualified
structures, they remain widely marketed by structured settlement com-
panies and life insurance companies, which issue the underlying
annuities.
Sometimes a plaintiff who receives a structured settlement,
whether qualified or not, chooses to sell his rights in the structure to a
third party. A sale of a qualified structure results in no gross income on
the theory that the sales proceeds represent excludable damages. A sale
of a nonqualified structure results in gross income equal to the amount
of the sales proceeds because no exclusion applies. 69 Under section 5891,
enacted by Congress in 2002, a sale of a qualified structure to a third
party buyer will result in a significant excise tax payable by the buyer
unless the sale is approved in advance by a court order.7" The excise tax
does not apply to the purchase of nonqualified structured settlements.
66. See P.L.R. 2008-36-019 (June 2, 2008).
67. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (explaining that private letter rulings
"may not be used or cited as precedent").
68. See Gregg D. Polsky & Brant J. Hellwig, Taxing Structured
Settlements, 51 B.C. L. REv. 39, 68-78 (2010) (criticizing the reasoning and
legal analysis in Childs and the letter ruling).
69. The plaintiff in a nonqualified structure also has no tax basis in
the structure because she has not paid any tax on the amounts remaining in the
structure.
70. The amount of the excise tax is equal to 40% of the "factor-
ing discount," which is the excess of the total undiscounted future payments
owed to the plaintiff over the purchase of the structured settlement. I.R.C.
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II. REPORTING OBLIGATIONS OF DEFENDANTS AND
INSURANCE COMPANIES
In general, defendants and insurers must file information reports to the
IRS for amounts paid to plaintiffs and attorneys. With respect to payments
to plaintiffs, defendants and insurers generally must report payments to
plaintiffs on Form 1099-MISC (Box 3), except for amounts that are
excluded from the plaintiff's gross income."v Thus, in physical injury
cases, no reporting is required unless a portion of the amount paid
represents interest, punitive damages, or the recovery of previously
deducted medical expenses. And, in nonphysical injury cases, the entire
payment is reported except for any portion representing the recovery of
prior medical expenses that were not previously deducted. In addition,
under the Banks rule, in a taxable award situation, the gross settlement
must be reported on the plaintiff's 1099-MISC even though some of the
amount will be retained by the plaintiff's attorney pursuant to a contin-
gent fee agreement.72
However, if the defendant is a current, former, or would-be
employer of the plaintiff, any amounts paid that represent wages
(generally back pay, front pay, or severance pay) must be reported on a
Form W-2, rather than on a Form 1099-MISC.73 In addition, wage char-
acterization triggers withholding obligations with respect to income
taxes and employment taxes.74 Therefore, the plaintiff will not receive
the gross amount of the wage portion of any settlement; instead, the
plaintiff will receive an amount net of this withholding. If the plain-
tiff also receives a payment of non-wages, such as emotional distress
§ 5891(a), (c)(4). To avoid the tax, the court order must determine, among
other things, that the sale of the structured settlement "is in the best interest of
the [plaintiff], taking into account the welfare and support of the [plaintiff's]
dependents." I.R.C. § 5891(b)(2)(A)(ii).
71. See I.R.C. § 6041(a) (reporting not required if the payment is
not made in connection with the payor's trade or business or if the amount
paid is less than $600); Reg. § 1.6041-1(c). Amounts allocated to interest
should be reported on Form 1099-INT, Box 1 (if $600 or greater).
72. See Reg. § 1.6041-1(f).
73. For discussion of the types of payments that are characterized
as wages, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
74. I.R.C. §§ 3101, 3402. It also triggers the employer's independent
obligation to pay the employer's share of employment taxes. I.R.C. § 3111.
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damages or reimbursement of attorney's fees, those are reported on
Form 1099-MISC and are not subject to withholding.
The importance of proper allocations-whether between com-
pensatory damages and punitive damages or interest in physical injury
claims, or between wage payments and non-wage payments in
employment-related claims-to plaintiffs was discussed above. Because
of these reporting requirements, proper allocations are relevant to defen-
dants and insurers as well. If allocations are incorrect, defendants or
insurers could be liable for any resulting underpayment of tax by plain-
tiffs as well as for penalties. For this reason, defendants generally have
little or no incentive to participate in aggressive allocations that, while
beneficial to plaintiffs (at least if they are not audited), to them are gen-
erally all risk and no reward.75 The result is that well-advised defendants
will err on the side of over-reporting income on Forms 1099-MISC and
wages on Forms W-2. Reporting amounts on these forms are not dis-
positive with regard to the plaintiff's ultimate tax consequences because
the plaintiff can report them differently on the plaintiff's own tax return.
However, inconsistent reporting between the plaintiff's tax return and
the defendant's information return will require an explanation and would
probably trigger some degree of IRS scrutiny.
Payments to the plaintiff's attorney trigger another reporting
obligation. In general, the gross amount paid to the attorney (by defen-
dants or insurance companies) is reported in Box 14 of Form 1099-
MISC. 76 This reporting obligation exists even if the payment is also
reported on another 1099-MISC with respect to the plaintiff or if the
plaintiff's recovery is wholly tax-free. It is a completely independent
reporting obligation.
In cases where one check, with plaintiff and attorney as joint
payees, is delivered to the attorney, both obligations will be triggered77
(except to the extent any of the plaintiff's damages are excluded, in which
case that portion will be exempt from Box 3 reporting with respect to
75. Because wage characterization triggers the employer-side por-
tion of wage taxes, avoiding this characterization does benefit employers to
some extent.
76. See Reg. § 1.6045-5. Reporting is not required if the payment
is not made in connection with the payor's trade or business or if the amount
paid to the attorney is less than $600. I.R.C. § 6041 (a)
77. See Reg. § 1.6045-5(f), Ex. 1.
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the plaintiff 8). If two checks are delivered-one to the plaintiff and one
to the attorney-both checks must be included on the plaintiff's 1099-
MISC (Box 3),79 but only the attorney's check must be included on the
attorney's 1099-MISC (Box 14).80 This is consistent with the rule in
Banks that requires the full settlement amount to be included in the
plaintiff's gross income (with the attorney fee payment treated as a
potential deduction).
III. TAX CONSEQUENCES FOR DEFENDANTS
In general, a defendant can deduct payments or settlements made in con-
nection with its business as ordinary and necessary trade or business
expenses. 1 This is true even for punitive damages, which are intended
to punish the defendant for particularly egregious conduct. 2 Because
deducting punitive damages lessens the sting of those damages by hav-
ing a portion of them effectively paid by the U.S. government in the form
of a tax reduction, legislation has been proposed that would disallow
deductions for punitive damages.83 To date, however, no such legisla-
tion has been enacted.
There are three departures from the general rule of deductibil-
ity of damages by business defendants. First, as already mentioned
above, the so-called Harvey Weinstein rule disallows deductions for
amounts paid in connection with sexual harassment or abuse if the par-
ties have entered into a nondisclosure agreement. 4 There is some
uncertainty about how this new rule would be applied in cases where
the sexual harassment or abuse allegations are accompanied by other
78. See Reg. § 1.6045-5(f), Ex. 2.
79. This assumes that none of the amount represents wages, in
which case a Form W-2 filing obligation will be triggered.
80. See Reg. § 1.6045-5(f), Ex. 3.
81. See I.R.C. § 162(a).
82. See Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 58 ("Amounts paid as puni-
tive damages incurred by the taxpayer in the ordinary conduct of its business
operations are deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense
under section 162 of the Code.").
83. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE
ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2011 REVENUE PROPOSALS 95 (2010) (describing
the Obama Administration's budget proposal to deny deductions for punitive
damages paid).
84. I.R.C. § 162(q).
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allegations, such as gender discrimination and unlawful termination.
Under one interpretation, the entire settlement would be nondeductible.
Under another, only the portion properly allocable to the sexual harass-
ment would be nondeductible. The latter interpretation arguably makes
more conceptual sense, but it also results in very difficult allocation issues
of the sort previously discussed. The defendant will have every incen-
tive to allocate away from the sexual harassment claim, and the plaintiff
will at best be indifferent to that allocation.85 It is likely that the govern-
ment will issue guidance on this issue, as well as the issue of whether
the denial of deductions for attorney's fees also applies to plaintiffs.
Second, payments made "to, or at the direction of, a government
or governmental entity in relation to the violation of any law or the inves-
tigation or inquiry by such government or entity into the potential vio-
lation of any law" are generally nondeductible. 86 However, this rule does
not apply to any amount paid "by reason of any order of a court in a suit
in which no government or governmental entity is a party."87 In addi-
tion, the rule does not apply to the extent the payor establishes that an
amount constitutes restitution and is identified as a restitution payment
in the court order or settlement agreement. 88
85. As discussed above, the new rule could arguably be interpreted
to disallow even the plaintiff's attorney's fees. See supra note 57 and accom-
panying text. If so, an allocation away from sexual harassment could affirma-
tively serve the plaintiff's tax interests as well.
86. I.R.C. § 162(f)(1). Prior to the 2017 Tax Act, this rule was nar-
rower. Historically, payments made to governments were nondeductible.
The 2017 Tax Act extends this rule to payments made "to, or at the direction
of a government or governmental agency" if the government or governmental
agency is a party in the litigation. I.R.C. § 162(f)(1), (3).
87. I.R.C. § 162(f)(3). For purposes of section 162(f), certain non-
government entities are treated as government entities. I.R.C. § 162(f)(5).
88. I.R.C. § 162(f)(2)(A). Prior to the 2017 Tax Act, regardless of
the language in the settlement agreement, a defendant could try to argue that
payments made to the government were non-punitive (e.g., compensatory or
restitution-type payments) in nature in order to preserve deductibility. See,
e.g., Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 763 F.3d 64, 69
(1st Cir. 2014). The 2017 Tax Act now requires that the payment be specifically
identified as restitution (or payments to "come into compliance with any law")
in the settlement or court order to be deductible. § 162(f)(2)(A)(i)(II). In addi-
tion, amounts paid by defendants as reimbursement for governmental investi-
gation expenses are no longer deductible. I.R.C. § 162(f)(2)(B). New Code
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Finally, in cases where a taxpayer is convicted of, or pleads
guilty or nolo contendere to, a violation of antitrust laws, the taxpayer
may not deduct two-thirds of a treble damages award or settlement. 9
IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF TAX EVIDENCE
In some cases, one or both parties may desire to introduce evidence of
tax consequences. For example, a defendant in a physical personal injury
case may try to introduce evidence that the plaintiffs award of lost wages
would be tax-free, even though if the plaintiff had earned those wages
in due course, they would have been subject to income and employment
taxes. If successfully introduced, this argument could drive down the
amount of wages awarded by the factfinder. This is because the fact-
finder would presumably award after-tax, rather the pre-tax, wages.
A. Tax Evidence Sought To Be Introduced by Defendants
The situation above-where the defendant attempts to introduce the fact
that some or all of a plaintiff's award will be tax-free-is the most com-
mon scenario where tax evidence has been attempted to be introduced.
For instance, assume that a physically injured plaintiff suffers lost wages
of $100,000 and that, if she had earned those wages in due course, she
would be left with only $60,000 after paying federal, state, and local
taxes. Can the defendant introduce this tax effect to the factfinder so as
to reduce its liability for lost wages from $100,000 to $60,000?
The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have deter-
mined this type of evidence to be inadmissible,9" and the Second Restate-
ment of Torts generally concurs.91 Courts justify this rule in two ways.
First, allowing the defendant to use the plaintiffs tax exclusion to reduce
its exposure would shift the benefit of section 104(a)(2)'s exclusion from
the plaintiff, who formally receives the exclusion, to the defendant, who
section 6050X imposes reporting requirements on governmental entities (and
entities treated as governmental entities under section 162(f)(5)) to ensure
compliance with these rules.
89. I.R.C. § 162(g).
90. See John E. Theuman, Annotation, Propriety of Taking Income
Tax into Consideration in Fixing Damages in Personal Injury or Death Action,
16 A.L.R. 4th 589, 594-99 (1982).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 914A (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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would pay a lower amount of damages due to the existence of the exclu-
sion. On the other hand, disallowing the tax evidence would overcom-
pensate plaintiffs because they walk away with the entire pre-tax award
when they would have been left with a smaller after-tax amount had the
tort not occurred. The section 104(a)(2) exclusion thus puts courts in
the position of choosing between under-deterring defendants or over-
compensating plaintiffs.9 2 Faced with this dilemma, courts have gener-
ally chosen the latter, erring on the side of the sympathetic victim over
the tortfeasor.93
Second, courts have noted that evidence regarding future tax
consequences can be quite speculative.94 This concern is implicated by
front pay awards. To adjust awards for tax effects, factfinders would have
to make their best guesses as to what the tax rates (and potentially other
tax rules) will be in the future, as well as the future income levels of
plaintiffs. Factfinders, however, must make their best guesses on many
issues in the damages context, including on the plaintiff's future employ-
ment, health, medical expenditures, and lifespan, as well as on future
interest rates and inflation. In this context, the speculation involved in
tax-effecting front pay awards does not seem at all exceptional.
While the majority rule is to disallow the introduction of evi-
dence relating to a plaintiff's special tax breaks, some courts have held
otherwise. The most famous case to buck the trend is the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt.95 That case
involved a wrongful death award under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act (FELA). Under the relevant part of FELA, an estate may receive
"the damages ... [that] flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary
92. See Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 143,
146 (1992) (noting that section 104(a)(2) "forces states to choose between
overcompensating plaintiffs and potentially underburdening defendants"
(footnote omitted)).
93. See, e.g., Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd, 376 S.W.2d 745, 749
(Ct. App. Tenn. 1963) (explaining that "to deduct the anticipated tax saving
from the recovery would nullify the tax benefit conferred by Congress in
expressly exempting damages for personal injuries").
94. See, e.g., id. (noting that introducing tax evidence "would inject
into the already difficult and complicated computations of [lost wages] dam-
ages factors which change from time to time, such as the rate of taxation and
the number of plaintiff's exemptions, and allow juries to indulge in specula-
tion and conjecture in arriving at the amount to be deducted").
95. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980).
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benefits which the [decedent's] beneficiaries might have reasonably
received."96 The Court held that this language requires that after-tax,
rather than pre-tax, earnings be considered because after-tax income
"provides the only realistic measure of [the decedent's ability] to sup-
port his family.""9 Accordingly, tax consequences were a "relevant fac-
tor in calculating the monetary loss suffered by his dependents when
he dies."98 This conclusion has been followed by lower federal courts in
other cases involving federal causes of action for lost earnings.99
B. Tax Evidence Sought To Be Introduced by Plaintiffs
1. Adverse Tax Consequences of Recovery
In employment discrimination cases, plaintiffs have successfully argued
that their awards should be augmented or "grossed up" to neutralize
adverse tax consequences that would otherwise be borne by them. The
most common adverse tax effect is due to the bunching of several years'
worth of wages into the year of settlement, which causes part or all of
the wage award to be subject to unusually high marginal tax rates. Con-
sider, for example, a plaintiff who, due to unlawful discrimination, has
been underpaid $20,000 for the past ten years. Had the $20,000 extra
pay been earned in due course, the pay would have been subject to a
combined federal and state marginal income tax rate of 25%. However,
when the $200,000 is received in the year of settlement, only $20,000
is taxed at a 25% rate and the remaining $180,000 is taxed at a 30% rate.
In that case, the plaintiff suffers an extra $9,000 tax burden."' 0 An aug-
mented award is necessary to fully restore the plaintiff. In addition,
96. Id. at 493.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 494.
99. See, e.g., Kirchgessner v. United States, 958 F.2d 158, 161
(6th Cir. 1992) (plaintiff's tax consequences may be introduced under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act); Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1988) (plain-
tiff's tax consequences may be introduced in claims arising under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Fanetti v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 678 F.2d 424, 431 (2d Cir. 1982) (stating
that the rule in Liepelt applies "at least to all federal law claims for future lost
wages").
100. $180,000 x (.30 - .25) - $9,000. For simplicity, this example
ignores the time-value of money.
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because the gross up is itself taxable, the plaintiff would have to receive
an augmentation of approximately $13,000.101
Nearly all federal courts that have considered this issue in the
employment discrimination context have held that tax gross ups are per-
missible due to the legislative mandate in federal anti-discrimination
laws to make the victim whole.1"2 For example, in a recent Title VII case,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the lower court erred by summarily
denying the plaintiff's request for a tax gross up to offset the adverse
effect of bunching back-pay amounts into a lump sum judgment. 113 In so
holding, the court emphasized that, while tax gross ups are permissible
in Title VII cases, they are not required in every case. Instead, trial courts
can use their discretion to determine whether to award a gross up in a
particular case.1"4
Some state courts have similarly permitted tax gross ups in dis-
crimination cases. For instance, the Washington Supreme Court found
that the Washington Law Against Discrimination permitted a tax gross
101. The plaintiff would have to pay a tax of 30% on the $13,000,
leaving the plaintiff with $9,100 to offset the adverse tax consequences. To cal-
culate the gross up, the adverse tax consequences (in this example, $9,000) is
divided by the excess of one over the plaintiff's marginal tax rate (here 30%).
102. See EEOC v. N. Star Hosp., Inc., 777 F.3d 898, 903-04 (7th Cir.
2015); Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 426, 440-43 (3d Cir. 2009); Sears
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 749 F.2d 1451, 1456-57 (10th Cir.
1984); O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446-48 (E.D. Pa.
2000); Arneson v. Sullivan, 958 F. Supp. 443, 446-47 (E.D. Mo. 1996), rev'd
in part, 128 F.3d 1243 (8th Cir. 1997). One federal appellate case upheld the
trial court's denial of an employment plaintiff's request for a gross up based
on a perceived lack of authority for such a gross up even though the case was
decided a decade after Sears, 749 F.2d. at 1451. Dashnaw v. Pena, 12 F.3d 1112
(D.C. Cir. 1994). However, this decision was a per curium opinion; there was
no analysis; and it ignored the earlier Tenth Circuit's decision in Sears. See
Clemens v. Centurylink Inc., 874 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) (criticizing and
declining to follow Dashnaw for these reasons and concluding that a gross up
is permissible in a Title VII case).
103. Clemens, 874 F.3d at 1115-17.
104. See id. at 1117 ("There may be many cases where a gross up is
not appropriate for a variety of reasons, such as the difficulty in determining
the proper gross up or the negligibility of the amount at issue. In any case, the
party seeking relief will bear the burden of showing an income-tax disparity
and justifying any adjustment.").
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up for back pay and front pay awards in a gender discrimination claim.1"5
And at least one federal district court has allowed a tax gross up with
regard to back pay and future economic damages awards in a sec-
tion 1983 case.1"6
All of these cases allowed gross ups with respect to back pay
and front pay awards. The logic behind these gross ups is that any exces-
sive taxation of those components (relative to how they would have been
taxed had they been earned in due course) should be borne by defen-
dants, not plaintiffs. A few plaintiffs have argued that gross ups should
also be applied to other types of damages, such as those for emotional
pain and anguish. These arguments, however, have not been successful.
For example, the Washington Supreme Court, which had previously
allowed gross ups for lost wages under the state's anti-discrimination
law, declined to gross up a plaintiff's award for emotional distress under
the same state law.1"7 The court reasoned that, because "Congress
explicitly decided that noneconomic damages were to be taxable when
they are attributable to nonphysical injury and Congress placed this tax
105. Blaney v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 87
P.3d 757 (Wash. 2004); see also Ferrante v. Sciaretta, 839 A.2d 993 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 2003). The underlying tax problem in both Blaney and Ferrante
did not involve bunching (which was the problem in the federal gross up cases),
but rather resulted from the alternative minimum tax rule's interaction with
the plaintiff's deduction for attorney's fees. While this specific tax problem
was solved by Congress's enactment of section 62(a)(20), these cases stand for
the broader proposition that tax gross ups are permissible, regardless of the
origin of the tax problem. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No. L-8976-03,
2007 WL 4239957 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. June 15, 2007) (allowing evidence
on adverse tax consequences to be introduced in employment discrimination
case to calculate gross up).
106. Humann v. City of Edmonds, No. 2:13-cv-00101, 2015 WL
3539569 (W.D. Wash. June 3, 2015).
107. Van Pham v. City of Seattle, 151 P.3d 976 (Wash. 2007); see
also Gibson v. City of Paterson, 199 Fed. Appx. 133, (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting
gross up for emotional distress and mental anguish damages in federal civil
rights case); Graham v. Brennan, No. 1:16-cv-00242-CL, 2017 WL 5505800
(D. Or. Sept. 26, 2017) (rejecting gross up for non-wage portion of award in
federal discrimination case); O'Neill, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 446 (rejecting gross up
for non-wage portions, while allowing gross up for back pay and front pay).
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burden on the plaintiff," "[s]hifting the tax burden on these awards
entirely to the defendant simply goes too far."1 8
2. Defendant's Tax Benefits from Paying Punitive Damages
Typically, when plaintiffs try to introduce tax evidence, it is to attempt
to augment their recoveries so as to counteract their own adverse tax
consequences, as discussed immediately above. Plaintiffs may also
attempt to introduce tax evidence regarding the defendant's favorable
tax consequences from paying damages. For instance, because punitive
damages incurred by businesses are deductible as business expenses,1"9
plaintiffs alleging punitive damages could try to introduce this tax effect
to support a higher award.11
Jurors assess punitive damages in an amount that they believe
will best "punish" the defendant. But, due to the tax effect, business
defendants will not be punished to the degree that the jury intends. For
example, assume that a jury determines that, based on the egregious-
ness of the defendant's conduct and its net worth, the defendant should
pay $10,000,000 in punitive damages. If the defendant is subject to a
108. Van Pham, 151 P.3d at 980-81 (emphasis in original).
109. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (allowing a deduction for ordinary and nec-
essary expenses incurred in carrying on a trade or business); Rev. Rul. 80-211,
1980-2 C.B. 57, 58 (explaining that punitive damages incurred in connection
with a taxpayer's trade or business are deductible under section 162). As dis-
cussed above, there are some situations where certain amounts paid by defen-
dants in narrow situations are not deductible. See supra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text. First, under the Harvey Weinstein rule, damages (and
attorney's fees) paid with respect to sexual abuse/harassment claims are not
deductible if the parties execute a nondisclosure agreement. I.R.C. § 162(q).
Second, payments made "to, or at the direction of, a government or govern-
mental entity in relation to the violation of any law or the investigation or
inquiry by such government or entity into the potential violation of any law"
are generally nondeductible. I.R.C. § 162(f)(1). Finally, in certain antitrust
cases, two-thirds of a treble damages award are nondeductible. I.R.C. § 162(g).
Outside of these three contexts, punitive damages (as well as compensatory
damages) are deductible by business defendants.
110. See generally Gregg D. Polsky & Dan Markel, Taxing Puni-
tive Damages, 96 VA. L. REV. 1295 (2010).
[Vol122:1
Taxing Litigation
combined effective federal and state tax rate of 25%,111 the after-tax cost
of the punitive damages is only $7,500,000, far less than what the jury
intended.
The Obama Administration proposed to fix this under-
punishment problem by amending the Code to disallow deductions for
punitive damages.112 While part of the Obama Administration's budget
for several years, the fix was never enacted into law. Because punitive
damages remain deductible by business defendants, plaintiffs should
seek to introduce evidence of this deductibility in punitive damage cases.
Plaintiffs would argue, either to a jury or judge, that the punitive dam-
age award should be grossed up to account for the defendant's ability to
deduct it. To gross up an award, the intended punishment amount sim-
ply needs to be divided by the excess of one over the defendant's effec-
tive marginal tax rate. Thus, in the example above, $10,000,000 would
be divided by .75 (1- .25), which yields a punitive damage award of
$13,333,333.113 The prospect of such a grossed up award should increase
pre-trial settlement amounts.
Defendants might argue that this approach is unfair to defendants
because the plaintiff's tax consequences are generally inadmissible.114
However, as explained above, there are good reasons to exclude evidence
of the plaintiff's circumstances, namely the fact that to do so allows a
tax benefit intended by Congress to benefit plaintiffs to be co-opted by
111. This is roughly the marginal tax rate to which a typical corpo-
rate defendant would be subject. The federal corporate rate is currently 21%
(I.R.C. § 11), and state corporate tax rates are often in the neighborhood of
6%. Morgan Scarboro, State Corporate Income Tax Rates and Brackets for
2018, TAx FOUND. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://taxfoundation.org/state-corporate
-income-tax-rates-brackets-2018/. Because state corporate taxes are deduct-
ible for federal income tax purposes, a 6% corporate tax rate translates to a
4.74% (6% x .79) effective state tax rate and would result in a 25.74% combined
effective tax rate.
112. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, supra note 83, at 95 (describing
the Obama Administration's budget proposal to deny deductions for punitive
damages paid).
113. When the defendant pays $13,333,333, the deduction saves the
defendant $3,333,333 ($13,333,333 x.25) in federal and state income taxes.
The result is an after-tax punishment of $10,000,000.
114. See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (discussing
majority rule that plaintiffs' tax evidence is not admissible).
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defendants. Defendants could also argue that tax evidence is unduly
complex or speculative, but when considered in the context of other
complex and speculative decisions that must routinely be made by fact-
finders, this argument does not appear to be persuasive.11
The potential introduction of tax evidence in punitive damages
cases also has implications for the constitutional review of punitive dam-
ages. Consider the case of State Farm v. Campbell, where the Supreme
Court set aside a jury's $145 million punitive damages award because
the amount of the award violated the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution's Fourteenth Amendment.116 In so doing, the Court announced
that "few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due pro-
cess. 117 Importantly, nothing in the opinion reveals that the Court (or
any lower court) was aware of the fact that the defendant, a large insur-
ance company, would have been able to deduct the punitive damages at
issue. Campbell's lawyers should have enlightened the trial court as to
the fact and effect of such a deduction, but this would have likely been
fruitless in this particular case because the Court found even the non-
grossed up amount excessive.
Nevertheless, the State Farm case seems to leave open the ques-
tion of whether, in assessing the constitutionality of punitive damage
awards, courts should focus on the pre-tax amount of the award or its
after-tax cost. For example, in applying the single-digit multiplier pre-
sumption, should courts compare the compensatory damages to the
nominal (i.e., pre-tax) amount of the award or to the actual (i.e., after-
tax) cost of the award? Business defendants would clearly prefer to use
the nominal amount of the award to keep the presumptive ceiling where
it is. To accomplish this, defendants might point to the language of State
Farm, which focuses on the nominal amount of the award.118
This argument, however, is not a very good one because the
Court in State Farm never addressed the defendant's tax consequences.
Indeed, it likely never realized that the after-tax cost of the award might
115. For a full discussion of the argument in support of tax gross
ups for punitive damages and the counter-arguments against, see Polsky &
Markel, supra note 110, at 1307-22.
116. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408,
417-29 (2003).
117. Id. at 425.
118. See id. at 429.
[Vol122:1
Taxing Litigation
have differed substantially from the nominal award. Even if the Court
were generally aware of the fact of deductibility, no evidence of the
deduction's value to the defendant was presented during the course of
litigation. Furthermore, because the majority in State Farm found its
rejection of the 145:1 ratio of nominal punitive damages to compensa-
tory damages "neither close nor difficult,.119 even if the Court were
inherently aware of tax consequences, a tax adjustment likely would
have made no difference to the disposition of that particular case.12
Thus, any suggestion that State Farm itself addressed the constitutional
tax-awareness issue places far too much weight on mere dicta.
The Court has interpreted the Due Process Clause to prohibit
"grossly excessive" punitive damage awards,121 and the application of
the single digit ratio presumption is intended to help courts assess when
punitive damages awards become unconstitutionally arbitrary depriva-
tions of property. Because the due process analysis focuses on the amount
of property deprivation, courts should focus on the after-tax cost of the
award because that is the amount that represents the real financial set-
back borne by the defendant. To focus on nominal or pre-tax amounts,
which in some cases will equal or closely approximate after-tax costs122
and in other cases will not, would introduce unnecessary arbitrariness
into the process. To more accurately assess the punitive force of dam-
ages on defendant, courts applying the due process analysis should focus
on the after-tax costs to the defendant.
This argument provides another incentive for trial lawyers to
introduce tax evidence in punitive damages trials against business defen-
dants. Not only should tax-aware factfinders, all else being equal, ren-
der higher punitive damage verdicts, but tax-aware judges should raise
the ceiling on constitutionally permissible awards.123
119. Id. at 418; see id. 425-26.
120. For example, even a 50% effective marginal rate would only
have brought the ratio down to 72.5:1, still well higher than the 10:1 standard
that the Court articulated.
121. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
122. If punitive damages relate to the defendant's personal conduct
(as opposed to the taxpayer's business activities) or if the defendant is tax-
exempt (such as a charitable, educational, religious, or other 501(c)(3) organi-
zation), the pre-tax award will be the same as the after-tax cost because the
defendant would receive no tax benefit from paying the award.
123. State Farm also reiterates that reviewing courts should com-
pare the amount of the punitive damages award to the amount of "civil
20181
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V. PERSONAL TAX ISSUES OF TRIAL LAWYERS
This Article turns now to the personal tax issues of trial lawyers them-
selves. This Part addresses tax issues that are unique to trial lawyers.
Part VI will then describe important tax law changes in the 2017 Tax
Act that, while broadly applicable, could be of significant interest to trial
lawyers.
A. Structured Attorney Fees
Structured settlements of plaintiff recoveries were previously discussed
in Part I.F. In qualified structures, which are only available in physical
injury and physical sickness cases, cash payments out of the structure
are entirely tax-free. 124 In nonqualified structures, which are used in
other settlements, the plaintiff realizes taxable income only when cash
payments are received.
Trial lawyers also sometimes structure their contingent fees. In
an attorney fee structure, instead of receiving the entire attorney fee in
cash upon settlement of the case, the attorney invests some or all of the
fee in an annuity that will pay the fee (plus an investment return) over
time. Attorneys who structure their fees take the tax position that there
is no immediate taxable income upon the funding of the structure. 125
Instead, income is realized by the attorney only as cash is paid out of
the structure. Thus, the intended tax results are similar to a plaintiff's
in a nonqualified structure. There are two benefits from this tax treat-
ment. First, the attorney's income tax liability with respect to the struc-
tured fee is deferred, from the time of settlement until the receipt of cash,
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." State Farm, 538 U.S. at
428 (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996)). In order
to make an appropriate apples-to-apples comparison, courts should compare
the after-tax costs of such penalties. As previously discussed, civil penalties
paid to, or at the direction of, governmental entities are generally nondeduct-
ible, so these nominal amounts of nondeductible civil penalties should be
compared to the tax-adjusted amount of deductible punitive damages.
124. Taxable components of awards that are otherwise tax-free
under section 104(a)(2) cannot be part of a qualified structure. These compo-
nents can, however, be placed in a nonqualified structure.
125. The funding of the structure is the purchase of the annuity
that will make payments to the attorney in the future.
[Vol122:1
Taxing Litigation
allowing the attorney to invest amounts that otherwise would have been
paid to the government. Second, a large contingent fee can cause the
lawyer to be in an unusually high tax bracket in the year in which the
fee was earned. Structured attorney fees allow the lawyer to "smooth"
the large fee over a period of time, reducing the marginal tax rate that
will apply to the income. These two benefits-tax deferral and income
smoothing-can be extremely valuable.
While qualified structured settlements have been legislatively
blessed in the Code, nonqualified structured settlements and attorney
fee structures are based on shakier legal ground. Proponents of these
structures rely on an anomalous Tax Court decision in Childs v. Com-
missioner.126 The taxpayers in that case were trial lawyers who had exe-
cuted a contingent fee agreement with a personal physical injury client.
The case was eventually settled, with both the client and the attorneys
structuring their respective litigation recoveries. Specifically, the defen-
dant's insurer agreed to make certain future payments to the client and
to the attorneys, and the insurer then assigned these payment obligations
to a structured settlement company. The structured settlement company
thereafter purchased an annuity to fund its assumed payment obliga-
tions.127 The Childs case addressed the tax consequences of the arrange-
ment to the attorneys.128 The precise issue was whether the attorneys
recognized income upon the creation of the structured arrangement or,
as the attorneys argued, only as the scheduled cash payments were
received.
The Tax Court sided with the attorneys, concluding that they
were required to report gross income only as they received payments
out of the structured settlement. The court found that the obligation of the
structured settlement company to make future payments to the attorneys
126. Childs v. Comm'r, 103 T.C. 634 (1994), aff'd, 89 F.3d 856
(11th Cir. 1996).
127. Id. at 639-42. The attorneys were named as the annuitants
under the annuity, and their respective estates were designated as contingent
beneficiaries of their share. However, the structured settlement company
remained the owner of the annuity.
128. The tax consequences to the plaintiff were clear because the
plaintiff's structure constituted a qualified structured settlement, which is
legislatively sanctioned. Accordingly, the plaintiff would have been able to
exclude all of the periodic payments from gross income.
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constituted an "unfunded and unsecured promise to pay," which is gen-
erally not taxable when received by individual taxpayers.129 However,
this conclusion has been criticized by commentators because the
unfunded and unsecured promise to pay rule traditionally applied only
to second-party promises, not to third-party promises. Under long-
standing caselaw, third-party promises were immediately taxed.13
Second-party promises are promises to pay made by the recipient of the
service provider's services, while third-party promises are promises
made by any other person. In the Childs case, the second-party was the
client of the attorneys; the client was the person for whom the attorneys
provided the services for which they were being paid. The promise to
pay by the structured settlement company was therefore a third-party
promise, and under well-established doctrine should have been imme-
diately taxed. However, the Childs opinion never addressed the second-
party versus third-party promise issue, so it did not even attempt to
distinguish the facts from those in other third-party promise cases.
For this reason, the Childs opinion has been criticized by commenta-
tors.131 The IRS has noted this criticism,3 though it has not formally
129. Childs, 103 T.C. at 649. Individual taxpayers typically report
their income using the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting,
under which an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay is not taxable. See
Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
130. See, e.g., Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244 (1951), aff'd,
194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
131. See Gordon T. Butler, Economic Benefit: Formulating a Work-
able Theory of Income Recognition, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 70, 118-19 (1996)
(contending that the holding in Childs is erroneous because the court failed to
recognize that the payment obligation was issued by a third party); Polsky &
Hellwig, supra note 68, at 1131-35 (same criticism as Butler); Gregg D. Polsky &
Brant J. Hellwig, Close the Yield Exemption Loophole Created by Childs, 123
TAX NOTES 1141 (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter Polsky & Hellwig, Loophole]. For
revenue rulings reaching a contrary holding in analogous factual circum-
stances, see Rev. Rul. 77-420, 1977-2 C.B. 172; Rev. Rul. 69-50, 1969-1 C.B.
140. Nonetheless, additional authority for the Tax Court's flawed interpreta-
tion of section 83 in Childs can be found in Minor v. United States, 772 F.2d
1472 (9th Cir. 1985). For discussion and criticism of the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion inMinor, see Polsky & Hellwig, supra note 68, at 1136-39.
132. See IRS Coordinated Issue Paper, Transfer or Sale of Com-
pensatory Options or Restricted Stock to Related Persons n.9 (October 14,
2004).
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repudiated the holding despite calls to do so.133 And the Tax Court deci-
sion in Childs was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit, albeit in an unpub-
lished per curiam opinion without any discussion.
13 4
Childs, therefore, remains "good law," though it remains possi-
ble that in the future the IRS will, through regulation or ruling, announce
its disagreement with it or will challenge attorneys residing outside the
Eleventh Circuit. The Childs case essentially creates a "super-IRA" sav-
ings vehicle just for trial lawyers. Traditional IRAs allow taxpayers to
invest a limited amount of pre-tax dollars in a retirement account. These
pre-tax dollars grow tax-free inside the IRA. When amounts are with-
drawn, they are taxed as ordinary income. Structured attorney fees are
similar to IRAs but are even better. While IRAs have strict annual con-
tribution limits, penalties for pre-retirement withdrawals, and required
minimum distributions after age 70, these rules do not apply to struc-
tured attorney fee arrangements.135 Structured attorney fees provide all
the tax benefits of IRAs without any of the restrictions or limitations,
and they are available only to the personal injury plaintiff's bar.136
As previously mentioned, the Childs holding and reasoning also
supports the intended tax treatment of nonqualified structured settle-
ments.137 Nonqualified structures are structured settlements entered
into by plaintiffs who receive taxable awards (or taxable components
of otherwise tax-free awards). While qualified structures have been
133. See Polsky & Hellwig, Loophole, supra note 131.
134. See Childs v. Comm'r, 89 F.3d 856 (11th Cir. 1996).
135. Amounts invested in structured settlements can be "with-
drawn" before retirement age either by providing for cash payments to be
received before then or by selling the structured settlement obligation for cash
to a third-party buyer.
136. Structured fee arrangements also compare extremely favor-
ably to employer-provided qualified plans, such as 401(k) plans. Both allow
for pre-tax contributions and tax-free compounding. However, structured fee
arrangements, unlike qualified plans, allow for unlimited contributions and
penalty-free early withdrawals and are not subject to the required minimum
distribution rules. In addition, unlike qualified plans, structured fee arrange-
ments may be created for the exclusive benefit of highly compensated employ-
ees. For this reasons, one lawyer has described the structured fee arrangement
as "a personal discriminatory retirement plan." Richard B. Risk Jr., Are You
Income Tax Deferring Your Fee? (2006), http://www.risklawfirm.com/files
/FormattedArticles/AreYoulncomeTaxDeferringYourFee.doc.
137. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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legislatively sanctioned, the tax consequences of nonqualified structures
are less clear. A 2008 private letter ruling determined that a plaintiff
who entered into a nonqualified structure was taxed only as the plaintiff
received cash payments out of the structure, a result that is consistent
with Childs, which is cited in the ruling.138 Though a private letter ruling
is binding on the IRS only with respect to the taxpayer who requested
it,139 the ruling and the holding in Childs has convinced the structured
settlement industry that, while not entirely free from doubt due to the
sloppy analysis by the Tax Court in Childs, nonqualified structures will
likely be taxable to plaintiffs only as they receive cash payments.
Attorney fee structures could be used to help certain plaintiffs
circumvent the denial of miscellaneous itemized deductions that was
included in the 2017 Tax Act.14 These deductions are scheduled to spring
back to life in 2026.141 Attorney fee structures may be used to defer the
deemed payment of attorney fees until 2026 or later.14 2 Under the theory
of Childs, attorney fee structures are deemed unfunded and unsecured
promises to pay, which generally result in deductions to the recipient of
the payee's services at the time of payment (not at the time the promise
to pay is earned).143 If so, attorney fee structures that delay payments
beyond 2025 could preserve deductions that would otherwise be lost.
There are several caveats that must be considered before implement-
ing this strategy. First, it must be remembered that the miscellaneous
138. See supra note 66.
139. See supra note 67.
140. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 54.
142. Attorney fee structures could be stand-alone structure (where
the plaintiff receives the full award in the year of settlement) or can be com-
bined with the plaintiff's structured settlement.
143. See I.R.C. § 83(h). Under the theory of Banks, any payments
to the attorney pursuant to an attorney fee structure are deemed to flow
through the plaintiff, who must report the payment in gross income and could
(to the extent allowed by law) claim the amount as a deduction. Combined with
the Childs reasoning, this means that as payments are made to the attorney, the
plaintiff realizes gross income and a deduction equal to the amount of the
attorney fee payment in that year. Thus, for example, if an attorney receives a
$100,000 payment from a fee structure in 2026, the plaintiff must include the
$100,000 in gross income and would receive a $100,000 miscellaneous item-
ized deduction in that year (assuming that the award in question is not excluded
under section 104(a)(2)).
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itemized deduction statute could be amended by Congress (either to fix
the denial of miscellaneous itemized deductions, which would make
the deferral of attorney fees unnecessary, or to extend the denial,
which could make deferral ineffective). Second, the historical limita-
tions on miscellaneous itemized deductions, which also are scheduled
to spring back to life, could dramatically impair the tax benefits actu-
ally realized by the plaintiff with respect to post-2025 attorney fee pay-
ments. The plaintiff's unique tax situation must be carefully considered
to determine the effect of those limitations. Third, while the theory of
Childs suggests that the attorney fee deduction should be deferred until
payments are made to the attorney, this conclusion is not free from doubt.
Childs itself is sloppily reasoned, and the IRS has not yet addressed
this situation in guidance or litigation.
Finally, the interaction between the Banks case and the excise
tax on transfers of qualified structured settlements must be considered.
As discussed earlier, in Banks, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that,
in a contingent fee arrangement, the entire recovery (including any por-
tion that is paid to the attorney pursuant to the fee agreement) consti-
tutes gross income to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is then treated as paying
her attorney. The conclusion in Banks that the attorney fee portion of
the award is deemed to "flow through" the plaintiff on its way to the
attorney may result in an unintended application of the excise tax in
section 5891.
Enacted by Congress in 2002, section 5891 imposes an excise
tax on a "transfer of structured settlement payment rights (including por-
tions of structured settlement payments) made for consideration by
means of sale, assignment, pledge, or other form of encumbrance or
alienation for consideration." '144 Congress was apparently concerned that
plaintiffs were selling their rights to future payments to factoring com-
panies at excessive discounts. The excise tax, which is imposed only
on transfers of qualified structured settlements,145 is equal to 40% of
the factoring discount, unless the transfer is approved in advance by a
144. I.R.C. § 5891(c)(3)(A) (defining "structured settlement factor-
ing transaction"). Section 5891 (a) imposes the excise tax "on any person who
acquires directly or indirectly structured settlement payment rights in a struc-
tured settlement factoring transaction."
145. I.R.C. § 5891(c)(1)(A) (defining, for purposes of the excise
tax, "structured settlement" to include only structured settlements that are
covered by the section 104(a)(2) exclusion).
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"qualified [court] order." '146 The factoring discount is equal to the excess
of the total undiscounted future payments owed to the transferee over the
present value of the future payments. 147 For example, if a plaintiff sells
ten future annual payments of $100,000 for a lump sum payment of
$600,000, the factoring discount would be $400,000 and the tax
imposed on the buyer $160,000, absent a qualifying court order. To con-
stitute a qualifying court order, the order must determine that, among
other things, the transfer "is in the best interest of the payee, taking
into account the welfare and support of the payee's dependents. 148
Under Banks, a structured attorney's fee arrangement is deemed
to flow through the plaintiff on its way to the attorney. The attorney's
rights to receive future payments are treated as first received by the plain-
tiff and then immediately re-transferred from the plaintiff to the attor-
ney in satisfaction of (in part or in whole) the plaintiff's contingent fee
obligation to pay the attorney for legal services. Unless a court order
that complies with the specific requirements of section 5891 approves
the re-transfer of the payment rights from the plaintiff to the attorney, a
significant excise tax could be imposed on the attorney at the time the
structured fee arrangement is created, provided that the attorney fee
structure would have been characterized as a qualified structure had it
been retained by the plaintiff. 149 This result was surely not intended by
Congress, which was focused on protecting plaintiffs from selling their
payment rights to factoring companies at huge discounts. Nevertheless,
the statute, which is broadly worded, and the Supreme Court's analysis
in Banks suggest that the excise tax would apply. Accordingly, attorneys
who structure their fees in a physical injury case should consider obtain-
ing a court order that complies with the requirements of section 5891.
146. I.R.C. § 5891(a), (b).
147. I.R.C. § 5891(c)(4).
148. I.R.C. § 5891(b)(2)(A)(ii); see also I.R.C. § 5891(b)(2)-(4)
(imposing other technical requirements that must be satisfied to qualify for a
court order).
149. To be a qualified structure, the damages that were contributed
to the structure must be excludable under section 104(a)(2). See supra note
145. Thus, the excise tax only potentially applies to situations where physi-
cally injured plaintiffs are involved (and then only to the extent that the dam-
ages contributed into the structure do not represent taxable components, such
as punitive damages or interest). In other words, the excise tax has no applica-
tion to nonqualified structures.
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B. Tax Treatment of Litigation Costs
Most commonly, litigation costs15 paid by contingent fee lawyers are
structured as advances from the lawyer to the client. The client will ulti-
mately be responsible for the costs, but the lawyer agrees to front the
costs until the case is resolved. When the case is resolved, the client
repays the "loan" out of the proceeds of the litigation, with the remain-
ing proceeds divided between the lawyer and the client as provided by
the contingent fee contract. If the proceeds of the litigation are insuffi-
cient to repay the advances, or if there are no proceeds at all, the client
may be personally responsible for the shortfall. Alternatively, the law-
yer might agree to not seek repayment of any shortfall, in which case
the arrangement is effectively a nonrecourse loan with the cause of action
serving as collateral.151
The tax issue regarding costs is whether they can be immedi-
ately deducted by the lawyers who front them or whether instead they
must be capitalized. If the costs are capitalized, the lawyer does not take
a deduction in the year in which the costs are incurred but instead the
costs are treated as an interest-free loan from the lawyer to the client.
When money is loaned, lenders get no deduction. Likewise, when loaned
money is repaid, the lender realizes no income. If loaned money is not
150. The Model Contingency Fee Agreement provided by the Cal-
ifornia bar includes the following list of advanced expenses:
court fees, jury fees, service of process charges, court and
deposition reporters' fees, interpreter/translator fees, out-
side photocopying and reproduction costs, notary fees, long
distance telephone charges, messenger and other delivery
fees, postage, deposition costs, travel costs including park-
ing, mileage, transportation, meals and hotel costs, investi-
gation expenses, consultant, expert witness, professional
mediator, arbitrator and/or special master fees and other
similar items.
Form No. 3, Sample Written Fee Agreement, Contingency Fee Agreement, CA.
STATE BAR 6, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/O/documents/mfa/2015/2015
_SampleFeeAgreements2-070115_r.pdf (last visited Dec. 3, 2018).
151. A nonrecourse loan is a secured loan where the lender's recourse
in the event of default is to foreclose on the collateral. On the other hand, a
recourse loan allows the lender to sue the borrower personally for any deficiency.
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repaid (because, e.g., it is forgiven by the lender), the lender generally
realizes a deduction.152
On the other hand, if costs are immediately deducted, then any
repayment of the costs is included in gross income. 153 If the costs are
not repaid, then there is no further deduction. 154 The differences between
the two approaches are summarized in Figure 3. Trial lawyers gener-
ally prefer to immediately deduct costs. Immediate deductions reduce
the lawyer's tax liability in the current year, though they will increase the
lawyer's tax liability in future years. 155 Nevertheless, this trade-off of
less current tax for more future tax is generally a happy one for tax-
payers, due to the time-value of money. The immediate deduction
approach is also administratively simpler and more intuitive because it
allows trial lawyers to treat costs in the same manner that they treat other
routine outlays such as office rent, supplies, insurance, advertising, and
staff salaries, which are all immediately deductible.
However, the IRS has consistently taken the position that all
litigation costs paid by contingent fee lawyers are capitalized, regard-
less of the technical particularities of the contingent fee agreement. 156
The IRS has thus far prevailed in all of the reported cases on the issue,157
152. See I.R.C. § 166.
153. See I.R. § 111.
154. A second deduction would allow the lawyer a double deduc-
tion for the costs-first at the time they are paid and then again when they are
forgiven.
155. Immediate deduction versus capitalization is simply a "now or
later" issue. If costs are deducted, the lawyer realizes a current deduction, but
when the client repays the costs, the lawyers will have income (and if the client
fails to repay the costs, the lawyer would get no deduction at that time). If costs
are capitalized, the lawyer gets no immediate deduction, but when the client
repays the costs, the lawyer has no income (and if the client fails to repay the
costs, the lawyer would realize a deduction at that time).
156. See, e.g., T.A.M. 1994-32-002 (Mar. 30, 1994); F.S.A. 1997
WL 33313738 (June 2, 1997).
157. See Humphrey, Farrington & McCain, P.C. v. Comm'r, T.C.
Memo 2013-23, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1150 (2013); Badell v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo
2000-303, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 422 (2000); Boccardo v. United States, 12 Cl. Ct.
184 (1987); Silverton v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1977-198, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 817
(1977), aff'd without opinion, 647 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1981); Herrick v. Comm'r,
63 T.C. 562 (1975); Canelo v. Comm'r, 53 T.C. 217 (1969), aff'dper curiam,
447 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1971); Burnett v. Comm'r, 42 T.C. 9 (1964), aff'd in
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Figure 3:
Treatnent of costs Payment of costs by Repayment of costs by Costs waived (not
la1yer client at settlement repaid by client)
Immediate deduction Deduction Income No tax consequence
Capitalization No deduction No income Deduction
with one notable exception involving so-called "gross fee" contingent
fee contracts.158
Despite the IRS's well-known position on litigation costs and
its nearly universal success in the courts, a prominent commentator on
litigation-related tax issues believes that "[t]he vast majority of plain-
tiffs' law firms (either unwittingly or aggressively) probably do deduct
client costs as they pay them, rather than waiting until the case settles." '159
In addition, there have been several recent legislative proposals that spe-
cifically addressed the tax treatment of litigation costs. Some would
have allowed trial lawyers to immediately deduct their costs,16 while
others would have codified the IRS's position and required capitalization
in all situations (including in the context of gross-fee contracts).161 None
of these proposals have yet been enacted.
While the IRS has generally prevailed in court in arguing for cap-
italization, it did lose one case in the Ninth Circuit. In that 1995 case, the
Boccardo Law Firm had used a gross fee contract in some of its cases.162
In the gross fee contracts, the Boccardo Law Firm would simply receive
part, remanded in part on other grounds, 356 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1966); Hearn
v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 672 (1961), aff'd, 309 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1962).
158. Boccardo v. Comm'r, 56 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 1995).
159. Robert W. Wood, A Taxing Process, L.A. DAILY J. 5 (Jan. 13,
2009), http://www.woodllp.com/Publications/Articles/pdf/LDJO113005.pdf
160. See, e.g., H.R. 2519, 111th Cong. (2009). The same proposal
giving trial lawyers a tax deduction for litigation costs was attached to H.R.
6049, the Renewable Energy and Job Creation Act, also known as the "tax
extenders" legislation in 2008.
161. Both the House and the Senate bills of the 2017 Tax Act would
have required capitalization in all instances, but the provision was removed
by the conference committee. See Robert W. Wood, Contingent Fee Lawyers
Dodge Bullet in Tax Reform, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2018, 8:48 AM), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2018 /01/ 09 /contingent-fee -lawyers-dodge
-bullet-in-tax-reform/# 14e73eb54c7c.
162. See Boccardo v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 1993-224, 65 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2739, 2740 (1993), rev'd, 56 F.3d at 1016 (describing the Boccardo
Law Firm's gross fee contract).
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33.3% of any pre-trial settlement or 40% of any post-trial recovery
regardless of the amount of litigation costs that it incurred. The IRS
took the position that, despite the absence of an obligation to repay the
costs incurred by the law firm, the costs still had to be capitalized. At
trial, the Tax Court agreed with the IRS, concluding that the gross fee
contracts were substantively very similar to nonrecourse advances
because of the strong likelihood that the law firm would eventually
recoup its costs out of the eventual recovery.16 3
The Ninth Circuit then reversed the Tax Court's decision, deter-
mining that the absence of a repayment right in favor of the law firm
precluded characterization of the gross fee contract as a loan.164 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit held that the law firm's immediate deduction
of costs was proper. In 1997, the IRS issued a Field Service Advisory
that announced that the IRS disagreed with the Ninth Circuit's reason-
ing and would continue to assert that litigation costs incurred under a
gross fee contract had to be capitalized, except in the Ninth Circuit where
it was bound by the Boccardo decision.165
However, in 2004, nine years after the Boccardo decision, the
Treasury Department issued a set of regulations that broadly address
capitalization issues relating to intangible assets.166 A careful reading
of those regulations appears to confirm the correctness of the Ninth Cir-
cuit's approach with regard to gross fee contracts.167 Thus, in gross fee
contracts nationwide lawyers should be able to immediately deduct lit-
igation costs. On the other hand, the 2004 regulations confirm the tra-
ditional IRS view that costs in non-gross-fee situations must continue
to be capitalized.168
163. Boccardo, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) at 2742-43.
164. Boccardo, 56 F.3d at 1018-19 ("It is difficult to see how the
label of 'advances' with its implication of 'loans' can be applied as a matter of
law to payments when there is no obligation on the part of the client to repay
the money expended.").
165. F.S.A. 1997 WL 33313738 (June 2, 1997). The 1997 FSA reit-
erated the IRS's position in a 1994 Technical Advice Memorandum, which
required capitalization of advanced litigation expenses. T.A.M. 1994-32-002
(Mar. 30, 1994).
166. See T.D. 9107, 2004-1 C.B. 447. The regulations are found in
Reg. § 1.263(a)-4.
167. See Gregg D. Polsky & R. Kader Crawford, Must Contingent
Fee Lawyers Capitalize Litigation Costs?, 141 TAX NOTES 295 (Oct. 21, 2013).
168. See id. at 300.
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VI. THE 2017 TAX ACT
On December 22, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Public Law
No. 115-97, formerly known as the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017,169 into
law (the "2017 Tax Act"). The 2017 Tax Act dramatically changed the
tax landscape. This Part addresses the changes that are most relevant to
trial lawyers with regard to their own personal tax situations."' :
A. The 200% Pass-Through Deduction
1. In General
In a very significant change, the 2017 Tax Act added Code section 199A,
which allows a 20% "pass-through deduction" (PTD) for certain busi-
ness income, subject to limitations and restrictions. If the full 20% PTD
is allowed, it shelters 20% of the taxpayer's business income, meaning
that the taxpayer is only taxed on 80% of her business income. Another
way to view the PTD is that (assuming that it is allowed in full) it reduces
the taxpayer's marginal tax rate on business income by 20%. A top-rate
taxpayer would therefore see her top federal income tax rate on busi-
ness income reduced from 37% to 29.6%.7' Table 1 illustrates the effect
of the PTD on marginal rates applicable to business income, assuming
that the taxpayer is allowed the full deduction.
The PTD is not an itemized deduction, which means that tax-
payers can claim the PTD even if they take the standard deduction.
17 2
However, the PTD is not an "above-the-line" deduction, so it does not
169. The official title of the law is "To provide for reconciliation
pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal
year 2018."
170. The 2017 Tax Act included some changes that have the potential
to significantly impact litigants themselves. The denial of miscellaneous item-
ized deductions can affect certain plaintiffs. See supra Part I.D. The so-called
Harvey Weinstein rule can affect both plaintiffs and defendants in sex abuse or
harassment cases. See supra Part I.E (discussing possible effect on plaintiffs)
and notes 84-85 (discussing effect on defendants). In addition, the 2017 Tax
Act made important changes to the historic rule that government fines and pen-
alties are per se nondeductible. See I.R.C. § 162(f) and supra notes 86-88.
171. 37% less (20% of 37%) - 29.6%.
172. See I.R.C. § 63(b)(3) (allowing taxpayer to claim section 199A
deduction and the standard deduction). The standard deduction was raised
20181
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Table 1:
Effective Marginal Rate
"Ordinary" Marginal Rate on Business Income
10% 8%
12% 9.6%
22% 17.6%
24% 19.2%
32% 25.6%
35% 28%
37% 29.6%
reduce the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. 17 3 Adjusted gross income
is a measure that affects the ability to claim other deductions, such as
the medical expense deduction.17 4
The PTD applies only to income earned by individuals either
directly175 or through a pass-through entity, such as an S corporation,
17 6
partnership, limited liability company, limited liability partnership, or
other non-corporate entity.177 Non-corporate entities are generally con-
sidered "partnerships" for federal tax purposes and their owners
significantly in the 2017 Tax Act, and some itemized deductions were severely
limited or eliminated. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
173. See I.R.C. § 62(a) (listing above-the-line deductions and omit-
ting section 199A deduction).
174. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. Adjusted gross
income is also often used as the starting point for state income taxes.
175. Direct income includes sole proprietorship income. It also gen-
erally includes income of non-corporate entities (such as LLCs) that have only
one member. These single member non-corporate entities are disregarded for
federal income tax purposes, which means that their income is treated as sole
proprietorship income by the IRS. See Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(1)(ii).
176. An S corporation is a special corporation that does not itself
pay tax; instead, its income and deductions pass-through to the owners. I.R.C.
§ 1361 et seq. The same pass-through taxation applies to partnerships and other
non-corporate entities. To be an S corporation, the corporation generally must
have only U.S. individuals as shareholders and only one class of stock, among
other requirements; in addition, a valid S corporation election must be in effect.
See I.R.C. §§ 1361-1363.
177. See I.R.C. § 199A(a) (allowing deduction "[i]n the case of a
taxpayer other than a corporation").
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"partners," and such terminology will be used in this Article.17 C cor-
porations179 are not allowed to claim the PTD. (Under the 2017 Tax Act, C
corporations instead received the benefit of drastically reduced corpo-
rate tax rates, as discussed below in Part VI.B.)
Business income that is eligible for the PTD is generally income
earned by an individual (directly or indirectly) subject to two import-
ant carve-outs. First, wages earned by an employee do not generate the
PTD.180 Therefore, employees of any businesses will not benefit from the
PTD. Second, "guaranteed payments" received by partners of partner-
ships do not generate the PTD.181 Guaranteed payments are defined as
payments that are made to partners that are "determined without regard
to the income of the partnership. 182 On the other hand, payments to part-
ners that can vary depending on the success of the business are not
guaranteed payments. 
183
For taxpayers with income below certain thresholds, these two
carve-outs (for wages and guaranteed payments) are the only impedi-
ments to claiming the PTD. Specifically, for married taxpayers with tax-
able income below $315,000 and unmarried taxpayers below $157,500,
178. See generally Reg. § 301.7701-3. These non-corporate entities
can elect to be treated as corporations for income tax purposes. See Reg.
§ 301.7701-3(a). This Article assumes that no such election has been made.
179. C corporations are corporations that are not S corporations,
either because they are not eligible to be S corporations or because they have
not made a valid S corporation election.
180. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(B). In addition, if a business is operated as
an S corporation, the IRS can recharacterize distributions to an owner-employee
as wages if the stated wages of the owner-employee are unreasonably low. See,
e.g., David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 714 F. Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Iowa
2010). In such a case, the recharacterized wages would not be eligible for the
section 199A deduction.
181. See I.R.C. § 199A(c)(4)(B).
182. I.R.C. § 707(c).
183. However, section 199A(c)(4)(C) allows the IRS to exempt cer-
tain "disguised compensation" distributions. This would apply where pay-
ments to a partner appear to be subject to the business risks of the partnership
but in substance are not. For example, a payment of the first $100,000 of gross
income to a partner in a partnership that routinely generates $10,000,000 of
gross income would be treated as disguised compensation, which means that
the payee partner would not get the benefit of the section 199A deduction with
respect to the $100,000 payment.
2018]
Florida Tax Review
the PTD is allowed in full for business income other than wages and
guaranteed payments.184 Above those limits, the PTD gradually phases
out until it is potentially eliminated at taxable income levels of $415,000
and $207,500, respectively, for married and unmarried taxpayers.
For taxpayers above the $315,000/$157,500 taxable income lim-
its, other hoops must be jumped through in order to claim the full PTD.
First, there is a blanket exception for "specified service" income."' Spec-
ified services include the performance of services in the fields of law,
health, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, consulting, ath-
letics, financial services, brokerage services, or the performance of any
business where the principal asset of such trade or business is the repu-
tation or skill of one or more of its employees or owners.186 Second, for
other income, there is the following limitation. The PTD amount, which
is tentatively 20% of business income, is capped at the greater of: (1)
50% of the amount of W-2 wages paid by the business and (2) 25% of
the amount of W-2 wages paid by the business, plus 2.5% of the origi-
nal cost of the business's tangible depreciable property.187
2. Potential Pass-Through Deduction Strategies for Lawyers
Because of the inclusion of the practice of law as a specified service,
the PTD opportunities for lawyers are somewhat constrained. Potential
PTD strategies for lawyers can be grouped into one of two categories.
First, there are strategies for law practices where some lawyers will earn
less than the $415,000 (married) /$207,500 (unmarried) taxable income
thresholds. These strategies attempt to reclassify W-2 wages and guar-
anteed payments so as to allow payees to claim the PTD. Second, there
are potential strategies to restructure, recharacterize, or otherwise recast
legal services income as other types of business income to avoid the
184. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(3) (exempting taxpayers below income thresh-
olds from the W-2 wages limits), (d)(3) (exempting taxpayers below income
thresholds from the specified services exclusion), (e)(2) (defining threshold
amounts). For this purpose, taxable income is computed without regard to the
PTD. I.R.C. § 199A(e)(1). Thus, it is the excess of gross income over all allow-
able deductions (including the standard deduction) other than the PTD.
185. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1)(A).
186. See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2)(A).
187. I.R.C. § 199A(b)(2)(B). The rules for calculating 2.5% of the
original cost of tangible depreciable property are found in section 199A(b)(6).
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"specified services" taint, although recently proposed Treasury regula-
tions would, if finalized, significantly impair their viability.188
a. Strategies for Lawyers Below the Income Thresholds
For taxpayers above the $415,000/$207,500 taxable income thresholds,
legal services income is completely ineligible for the PTD. For taxpay-
ers below the $315,000/$157,5000 thresholds, legal services income is
entirely eligible for the PTD unless the income is in the form of wages
earned by an employee or guaranteed payments earned by a partner. For
taxpayers between those two thresholds (i.e., between $315,000 and
$415,000 for married persons or between $157,500 and $207,500 for
unmarried persons), the PTD is partially allowed for legal services
income, provided that it is not in the form of wages or guaranteed
payments.
For lawyers who will earn taxable income below these thresh-
olds, they will be better off as partners rather than employees. This is
because partners can receive the PTD (except with respect to the receipt
of guaranteed payments), while employees cannot. In addition, partners
who receive non-guaranteed payments are better off compared to those
who receive salaries or guaranteed payments.
To illustrate, assume that a married associate at a law firm is
expected to earn $200,000 in wages and that the associate's joint mar-
ried income will be less than $315,000. Absent any restructuring, the
$200,000 of wages is ineligible for the PTD. But if the associate is ele-
vated to junior partner and earns the same amount, the PTD is allowed
unless the payments are treated as guaranteed payments. To avoid
guaranteed payment status, the lawyer's rights to payments from the
firm must be dependent on the success of the law firm. For example, if
the lawyer's rights to payments are ultimately determined by the man-
aging partner based on the overall success of the law firm and the law-
yer's personal contributions to that success, all of the payments would
not be guaranteed and therefore they will be eligible for the PTD. But if
the lawyer is contractually guaranteed a minimum payment of $100,000
and ultimately receives $225,000, then only $125,000 is eligible for
the PTD.
Before embarking on this strategy, several factors must be care-
fully considered. First, making the associate a partner will have other
188. See 83 Fed. Reg. 40884 (Aug. 16, 2018).
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tax effects. Partners are not employees, so instead of the associate receiv-
ing wages that are subject to withholding, she will now receive self-
employment income to which withholding does not apply. This means
that she will be required to make quarterly estimated tax payments. She
will also no longer receive weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly paychecks but
instead will receive periodic "draws" of partnership income. She will
be liable to repay these draws to the extent they exceed her ultimate dis-
tributive share of the law firm's income, which will be determined by
the managing partner. Also, as a self-employed person, she will pay both
sides of employment taxes, whereas when she was an employee she paid
only the employee's half, with the law firm paying the other half This
can be fairly easily taken into account in setting the amount of payments.
If an employee earns $200,000 in 2018, the employer will pay about
$11,000 in employer-side employment taxes. So the law firm could pay
the junior partner $211,000.
Second, the strategy imposes additional risk on the new junior
partner. Whereas before she received a fixed salary and perhaps a con-
tingent bonus, now (to maximize the PTD) all of her pay is contingent,
at least as a technical legal matter. There is no such risk with respect to
salaries or guaranteed payments.
Third, the IRS might reject the claimed partner status of the new
junior partner. Recently issued proposed regulations include a presump-
tion that a new junior partner remains an employee.189 This presump-
tion may be rebutted by the new junior partner upon a showing that she
is in fact performing services in a partner capacity (as opposed to an
employee capacity). Thus, for example, if the new junior partner can
establish that her income allocation is significantly contingent on the law
firm's profitability and that she now participates in management deci-
sions, she will be able to rebut this presumption.19 However, if her rela-
tionship with the other partners of the law firm is materially unchanged,
then the IRS would continue to treat her as an employee.
Finally, there are other legal distinctions between employee sta-
tus and partner status. For example, partners owe and may be owed
189. See Prop. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d)(3)(i), 83 Fed. Reg. 40884, 40927
(Aug. 16, 2018).
190. Cf Prop. Reg. § 1.199A-5(d)(3)(ii), Ex. 3, 83 Fed. Reg. 40884,
40927 (Aug. 16, 2018) (explaining that engineer's promotion to partner would
be respected in part because the engineer now shares in the overall net profits
of the engineering firm).
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certain fiduciary duties that do not apply in equal force with regard to
employees. And, from an employee benefits perspective, partners are
often distinguished from employees.
Therefore, while in theory the transformation from mostly fixed-
pay employee to contingent-pay partner is an easy strategy to generate
PTD-eligible income, in practice the transformation might not be worth
the hassle. Each situation must be assessed based on its own facts and
circumstances.
b. "Cracking" Legal Services Businesses
Above the income thresholds, creating PTD for lawyers is much trick-
ier due to the specific carve-out of legal services as a specified services
business. One possibility is to re-characterize legal services income as
other types of income. Commentators have discussed the possibility of
"cracking" a PTD-ineligible line of business into separate components,
some of which could be PTD eligible.
For example, a law firm that owns its real property might cre-
ate a separate entity to own the property and lease it to the law firm. To
be successful, the leasing activity would have to constitute a trade or
business, which requires a requisite amount of continuous and regular
activity.191 In addition, sufficient wages must be paid by the leasing
business (or property owned by the leasing business) to allow for sig-
nificant PTDs to satisfy the "greater of' test.1"' And the lease rate must
be consistent with market rates.193
A similar strategy could be attempted with regard to other ancil-
lary activities of a legal practice. The Wall Street Journal recently
reported on an immigration law firm's strategy to split its operations
between its legal practice (which would employ the firm's lawyers)
and its administrative work, which would be handled by the firm's
26-person administrative staff.194 The latter entity would "put together
191. See generally Comm'r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
192. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text (describing
the PTD limit to the greater of 50% of wages paid or the sum of 25% of wages
paid plus 2.5% of property cost).
193. See generally I.R.C. § 482 (allowing the IRS to reallocate income
and deductions among related taxpayers so as to properly reflect income).
194. See Ruth Simon & Richard Rubin, Crack and Pack: How Com-
panies Are Mastering the New Tax Code, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 3, 2018), https://
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immigration applications and handle other tasks." '195 If this restructur-
ing were respected by the IRS, the latter entity's profits would be eligi-
ble for the PTD (subject to the "greater of' test) because that entity's
business does not engage in the practice of law or in any other specified
services.1"6 However, it is quite possible that the IRS would treat the
businesses as a single integrated law practice, which would eliminate
the ability to claim the PTD.
Likewise, a law firm could attempt to split off its intellectual
property rights into a separate entity and have the law firm lease those
rights. Or a law firm that engages in non-legal work such as trusteeships,
personal representative activities, title-agent work, or expert-witness
activities could attempt to segregate these activities in an attempt to gen-
erate the PTD.
However, recently proposed Treasury regulations would, if
finalized, make these strategies ineffective. These proposed regulations
explain that, if there is more than 50% common ownership between the
law firm and the ancillary real estate or other business and if the ancil-
lary business provides 80% or more of its property or services to the
law firm, then the income of ancillary business will be deemed to be
legal services income that is ineligible for the PTD.197 In addition, if there
is more than 50% common ownership but less than 80% of the property
or services is provided to the law firm, then the rent or fees paid by the
www.wsj.com/articles/crack-and-pack-how-companies-are-mastering-the
-new-tax-code-1522768287?ns-prod/accounts-wsj.
195. Id.
196. The prices paid by the law firm entity to the administrative ser-
vices entity would have to be consistent with an arm's length arrangement. See
supra note 193 and accompanying text. The taxpayer would like to have the law
firm pay as generous a rate as possible because any excess profits realized by
the administrative services entity (at the expense of the law firm entity) would,
if respected, be eligible for the PTD. Thus, for every $100 of profit so shifted, a
taxpayer in the highest marginal tax rate could save $7.40 in federal taxes.
197. See Prop. Reg. § 1.199A-5(c)(2)(i), 83 Fed. Reg. 40884, 40926
(Aug. 16, 2018). An example considers the situation where a law firm rents its
building and buys administrative services from two separate partnerships,
both of which are owned entirely by law firm partners. In addition, all of the
rental and services income of the two partnerships stem from the law firm. The
example concludes that the rental income and administrative services income
is treated as legal services income. See Prop. Reg. § 1.199A-5(c)(2)(iv), 83
Fed. Reg. 40884, 40926 (Aug. 16, 2018).
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law firm to the ancillary business will be deemed to be legal services
income.198 If these parts of the proposed regulations are finalized, they
will be retroactively effective back to the enactment date of the 2017
Tax Act.199
B. Drastically Reduced Corporate Rates
Prior to the 2017 Tax Act, the income of C corporations was taxed at a
maximum rate of 35%. The 35% top rate for corporations had been in
effect for many years. The 2017 Tax Act reduced that rate to 21%. On
the other hand, the top individual rate dropped only from 39.6% to 37%.
In addition, while the state and local tax deduction for individuals was
limited by the 2017 Tax Act to a maximum of $10,000, the state and local
tax deduction for corporations remains unlimited.
Because of these changes, businesses that cannot easily get the
PTD, such as those in specified services, may consider converting their
entity to a C corporation. 2"0 This is particularly true if the owners of the
business intend to leave a significant amount of the profits in the busi-
ness, where they can compound while paying taxes at the much lower
corporate rate.
However, such a strategy is risky and must be carefully evalu-
ated. While corporate tax rates are now low, it is a distinct possibility
that they will go up in the future. While less likely, it is also possible
that individual tax rates could go down. Compounding these risks, while
it is very easy (tax-wise) to convert a partnership to a corporation, the
inverse is often highly problematic.
C. Enlarged Expensing
The 2017 Tax Act extended "bonus depreciation" rules that allow tax-
payers to immediately deduct the cost of certain tangible business
198. See Prop. Reg. § 1.199A-5(c)(2)(ii), 83 Fed. Reg. 40884, 40926
(Aug. 16, 2018).
199. See Prop. Reg. § 1.199A-5(e)(2)(i), 83 Fed. Reg. 40884, 40927
(Aug. 16, 2018).
200. If a specified services business is already a C corporation, it
may consider retaining more of its profits. Historically, these businesses would
tend to "zero out" their corporate income by paying out all of their income in
the form of wages and bonuses.
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property, such as office equipment and furniture, instead of claiming
annual depreciation deductions over time. Previously, bonus depreci-
ation applied strictly to new property (as opposed to property that had
previously been used by another person) and only 50% of a property's
cost could be immediately deducted. After the 2017 Tax Act, used
property is eligible and the entire cost of the property can be immedi-
ately deducted.2 1 The new bonus depreciation rules are scheduled to
gradually phase out beginning in 2023 and will (absent further legisla-
tive action) fully expire on December 31, 2026.212
The 2017 Tax Act also enlarged section 179, which allows small
businesses to immediately deduct the cost of certain tangible business
property. New section 179 allows up to $1 million (up from $500,000)
of such property to be immediately deducted, and it begins to phase out
once a taxpayer places more than $2.5 million (up from $2 million) of
such property into service. Unlike the changes to bonus depreciation,
which are scheduled to fully expire in 2026, the changes to section 179
are permanent.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this Article has shown, a whole host of tax issues can arise in the
personal injury context. The taxation of plaintiffs can be quite compli-
cated, especially after the 2017 Tax Act's elimination of miscellaneous
itemized deductions. Tax allocations in settlement agreements are very
important, and because of the information reporting requirements placed
on defendants and insurance companies (and the corresponding liabil-
ity for under-reporting), negotiations over allocations can be fraught.
Structured settlements, both qualified and nonqualified, can provide sig-
nificant tax benefits for plaintiffs who intend to invest a substantial
amount of their recoveries.
Tax information may also constitute admissible evidence.
Defendants may seek to introduce the tax-free nature of certain recov-
eries to reduce their exposure. While defendants have generally not been
successful in this regard, in discrimination cases plaintiffs have success-
fully used tax evidence to augment their awards to counteract certain
adverse tax consequences.
201. I.R.C. § 168(k)(2)(A)(ii).
202. I.R.C. § 168(k)(6)(A).
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Finally, plaintiff's lawyers face their own interesting personal
tax issues. Attorney fee structures may be used to reduce the present
value of their tax burden. The tax treatment of litigation advances
remains muddled and counter-intuitive. In addition, the 2017 Tax Act has
created a number of potential tax planning options for these lawyers.
